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ABSTRACT 
THE MICROFOUNDATIONS OF MIDDLE MANAGER STRATEGIC 
INFLUENCE: THREE ESSAYS 
 
FEBRUARY 2015 
DAVID G. COHEN, B.A., THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
J.D., THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Bill Wooldridge 
 
My dissertation is a set of three independent papers exploring both conceptually 
and empirically the processes by which middle managers influence organizational 
strategy.  Specifically, I examine the hows and whys of middle management strategic 
influence.  By what mechanisms do middle managers change the course of organizational 
strategy and why do some middle managers, but not others, change the organization’s 
strategic direction?  I do so from a perspective of methodological reductionism (that is, I 
look to the actions of the individual for explanations of organizational level phenomena, 
such as strategic change).  In particular, all three papers explore how an individual middle 
manager’s structural position within the firm interacts with personal characteristics 
(broadly defined) to explain strategic influence or its absence.  As such, I contribute to 
three different strategy literatures: research examining strategic change (Naranjo‐Gil, 
Hartmann & Maas, 2008); the middle management perspective on strategy process 
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(Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 2008); and the microfoundations of strategy process 
(Schmid, Floyd & Wooldridge, 2010).   
Although my three papers are tightly tied to my central research question, each 
paper differs in its focus.  My conceptual paper (The Strength of Moderate Identities:  
The Microfoundations of Middle Manager Divergent Strategic Influence) develops a 
person-situation model of middle management lead strategic change.  I suggest that 
middle managers situated in particular structural positions are more likely than others to 
be able to change organizational level strategy, but the relevant structural position differs 
with different strategic types.  Even then, properly situated managers’ ability to see new 
strategic opportunities depends upon individual level characteristics.  
Because of my interest in the microfoundations of strategy process, my second 
paper (Thar She Blows!  Middle Managers and the Microfoundations of the Attention 
Based View of the Firm) is qualitative, using the perceptions of individual middle 
managers to elucidate process (the “how” question) and to generate more fine-grained 
theory.  I report qualitatively on three attempts (two successful and one unsuccessful) by 
middle managers to influence organizational strategic change by directing the attention of 
top managers to strategic opportunities.  I use this research to build theory about the 
microfoundations of the attention based view (ABV) of the firm; specifically the role of 
individual middle managers in alerting the firm to environmental change.  In particular, I 
examine the question of how individual structural position and cognition is enlisted to 
supplement top manager attention.  I contribute to the strategy process literature (and 
specifically to both the ABV and middle management perspective) by using the tools of 
microfoundations research to work towards an attention based view of middle 
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management, thus allowing for a richer and more textured understanding of the cogs and 
wheels of strategic change. 
Because I theorize that middle manager strategic influence can be traced back, in 
part, to structural factors, my third paper is a social network study (The Microfoundations 
of Middle Manager Strategic Influence In A High Tech Firm) focusing on structure and 
its interaction with personal characteristics.  If large firms are information moving and 
reasoning machines (Ocasio, 1997; Simon, 1947), then an understanding of the processes 
and routines that lead to strategic change (Teece, 2007) must incorporate an 
understanding of how information moves through the firm and whether “reasoning” takes 
place in particular people, as an artifact of organizational routines or both.  Tracing these 
mechanisms to their foundation is part of the microfoundational turn in strategy process 
research (Schmid, Floyd and Wooldridge, 2010; Teece, 2007; Felin and Foss, 2005).  In 
my third paper I add to this literature (and speculatively to the theory of the firm) by 
trying to find a link between strategic influence, access to information and behavior in the 
ego-networks of middle managers in a high tech firm. In particular, in my sample 
synthesizing behavior has significantly more weight in contributing to perceived 
influence than any of the other three Wooldridge and Floyd (1992) types of middle 
management strategic influence.  Although the generalizability of this work is limited, it 
does point towards some interesting areas of future research into how middle managers 
influence strategy and, more broadly, into the internal processes that lead to strategic 
change. 
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation, I present three papers examining middle manager strategic 
influence in partial fulfillment of the requirements of a Doctor of Philosophy degree in 
Management from the Isenberg School of Management and the Graduate School of the 
University of Massachusetts Amherst.  These independent but interrelated papers each 
explores, conceptually or empirically, a different aspect of middle manager strategic 
influence.  As required for a PhD, my dissertation demonstrates intellectual competence 
and maturity in strategic management; makes an original and valid contribution to human 
knowledge; and is my individual achievement and the product of my independent 
research.  (A copy of my Human Subjects Review Approval Form is Appendix A.) 
The questions I have researched are both firmly grounded in the existing strategic 
management literature and implicate issues currently at the forefront of our discipline.  
How organizations manage strategic change is one of the fundamental questions of 
strategic management.  Once an organization has left behind its initial entrepreneurial 
phase, strategy largely becomes a question of continued environmental fit (Venkatraman, 
1989).  Once the organization reaches a certain level of complexity such that internal and 
external monitoring has grown beyond the ability of one or a few individuals, strategy 
development becomes a process of formal and informal routines (Simon, 1997; Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 2000).  This environment/strategy/structure coalignment process 
(Venkatraman, 1989) is at the root of some of the most important streams of strategy 
process research, including the top management team literature (Finkelstein, Hambrick & 
Cannella, 2008), the literature on corporate entrepreneurship, strategic renewal and 
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incremental strategic change (Dess, et al, 2003), and the literature on strategic response to 
environmental jolts (Garcia‐Sanchez, Mesquita & Vassolo, 2013).  
The Middle Management Perspective 
The importance of maintaining environmental fit also motivated the development 
of the middle management perspective on strategy process (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1998). 
For those researchers who take the position that our conception of strategy must include 
what the organization does and not simply what it intends to do (Mintzberg, 1978), an 
accurate description of strategy process as it exists within organizations starts with the 
ideas that strategy is formed rather than formulated, that strategy formation is a social 
learning process (Burgelman, 1983a), and that decisions taken by middle managers 
contribute to the pattern of decisions that are organizational strategy.  Our research has 
also shown that those organizations perform best that most successfully maintain 
coherence between their functional strategies and overarching organizational strategy 
(Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990).  Maintaining this coherence in complex organizations is 
a task largely entrusted to middle managers, whose principal job it is to bring the logic of 
organizational strategy to otherwise diverse functional strategies (Floyd & Wooldridge, 
1992).  This important middle management role – adjusting functional strategy to better 
fit organizational strategy – has been the subject of both theoretical and empirical 
attention (Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 2008).   
As important as this role is, however, it is only one of four middle manager 
strategic roles identified by Floyd & Wooldridge (1992).  Developing a two-by-two 
matrix formed at the intersection of two orthogonal axes, one between integrative and 
divergent strategic behavior, and the other between an upward hierarchical focus and a 
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downward hierarchical focus, Floyd & Wooldridge (1992) identified four types of middle 
management strategic involvement:  Implementing Deliberate Strategy 
(downward/integrative) (assuring that functional strategies fit into the organization’s 
overall strategy); Synthesizing Information (upward/integrative); Facilitating 
Adaptability (downward/divergent); and Championing Alternatives (upward/divergent).  
(See Figure 1.)  This fourth type, “Championing [Strategic] Alternatives”, has received 
the least empirical attention in the literature.  It is this role that two of my three papers 
focus upon.  My third paper, while still focused on middle manager strategic influence, 
tries to understand how specific middle managers within a single company understand 
middle manager strategic influence; that is, what are the individual level factors 
associated with middle managers identified by their peers as influential. 
Figure 1-1: A Typology of Middle Management Involvement in Strategy,  
Adapted From Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992. 
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Empirical Study of Divergent Strategic Involvement Is Rare 
Looking for empirical evidence of upward divergent strategic involvement in the 
published literature, I examined three overlapping sets of articles.  First, I examined the 
245 articles citing Floyd & Wooldridge (1992).  This first list is overbroad, including 
articles that are not primarily concerned with the middle management perspective on 
strategy process or in researching the typology of middle management strategic 
involvement.  Second, using Google Scholar (scholar.google.com), I searched for articles 
published in peer reviewed management journals containing phrases such as “middle 
management”, “corporate entrepreneurship” and “middle manager.”  This resulted in 52 
articles.  Finally, as a check against the other two lists, I reviewed the articles discussed 
in a recent review of the middle management literature (Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 
2008).   
As a result of this review, I identified 25 empirical articles published after Floyd 
& Wooldridge (1992) researching middle management involvement in strategy.  I then 
reviewed these articles to identify empirical research into upward/divergent strategic 
influence or, to use Floyd & Wooldridge’s (1992) terminology, Championing 
Alternatives.  A surprising number of these papers took a formulation/implementation 
approach to strategy (e.g., Burgelman, 1994; Dutton, Ashford, O’Neill, Hayes & Wierba, 
1997; King & Zeithaml, 2001; Huy, 2002).  This formulation/implementation dichotomy 
leads some researchers to classify anything that is not “mere implementation” (Currie, 
1999; Boyett & Currie, 2004) as divergent.  As implied by the formation conception of 
strategy (Mintzberg, 1978) that underlies the Floyd & Wooldridge (1992, 2000) typology, 
however, acting downward, while integrative, allows for middle manager innovation and 
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autonomy (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1996; Osterman, 2009).  Integratively, that autonomy is 
used to coordinate disparate organizational areas so that they work together in service to 
existing strategy.   
Second, when viewed through the lens of acting upward or acting downward, it 
was clear that many of the middle managers were acting downward.  That is, they were 
working to change functional strategies to match organizational strategy.  In Table 1-1, I 
have sorted the empirical middle management articles since 1992 into two columns based 
upon whether the middle managers were working to change the organization’s concept of 
strategy or whether they were working to bring functional strategy into better alignment 
with organizational strategy.  I found that most of the empirical articles published 
concerned changes to functional level strategy.   
Table 1-1: Empirical Research into Divergent and Integrative Middle 
Management Strategic Involvement. 
 
Divergent
Burgelman (1994)
Floyd & Wooldridge 
(1997)
Integrative
Balogun & Johnson (2004)
Boyett & Currie (2004)
Carney (2004)
Currie & Proctor (2005)
Dutton, Ashford, O’Neill, Hayes & Wierba
(1997)
Dutton, Ashford, O’Neil, & Lawrence (2001)
Hornsby, Kuratko, & Zahra (2002)
Huy (2002)
King & Zeithaml (2001)
Kodama (2005)
Laine & Vaara (2007)
Lines (2005)
Mair (2005)
Mangaliso (1995)
Mantere (2008)
Marginson (2002)
Meyer (2006)
Pappas & Wooldridge (2007)
Rouleau (2005)
Sillince & Mueller (2006)
Vilà & Canales (2008)
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In part, the scarcity of this research might be an artifact of a researcher bias 
against looking for middle manager strategic influence based upon the widely accepted 
idea that middle managers are not primarily responsible for formulating organizational 
strategy; that responsibility lies with top management (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  
Certainly, it is historically true that management scholars once accepted that top 
managers formulated strategy and middle managers implemented strategy, and that any 
deviation by middle managers would reduce performance and was likely self-interested 
resistance (e.g., Guth & MacMillan, 1986).  It is more likely, however, that upward 
divergent strategic influence is rare in the empirical literature because it is rare in 
organizations.  Why, therefore, do researchers find this phenomenon in only certain times 
and places, and only among certain middle managers? 
Of course, a gap in the literature is not necessarily interesting, either theoretically 
or empirically.  Sometimes a gap indicates a question that leads nowhere, or an answer 
that is too obvious.  As more fully developed in the proposed papers, this particular gap 
in the literature, however, is interesting because the phenomenon of interest plays out in 
unexpected ways, adds to our overall understanding of the process by which 
organizational strategy adjusts to changes in both the environment and in functional 
strategy, and highlights the tension between the need for strategic change and the need to 
strategic coherence.   
Among other things, upward divergent strategic involvement is interesting 
because it is on the one hand threatens existing organizational strategy with dis-
integration, and is thus usually dangerous, and on the other hand can pull organizational 
strategy towards better environmental fit, and is thus from time to time necessary.  
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Organizations need a coherent strategy legitimized by top management, suitable for the 
organization’s particular environment and carried out cohesively across functions.  In this 
sense, middle management efforts to change organizational strategy threaten to reduce 
performance by undercutting this alignment of the external environment and internal 
resources (Venkatraman, 1989; Venkatraman, 1990).  Middle managers, moreover, might 
not have a comprehensive understanding of strategy across the organization, with the risk 
that what appears to be an opportunity for the organization within their relatively narrow 
field of view might be a threat to the organization overall. 
On the other hand, within their particular areas of responsibility, middle managers 
do have greater knowledge of particular aspects of the organization’s local environment 
or resources than top managers.  If that knowledge points to the need to change strategy, 
either to capitalize on an opportunity or to avoid a threat, the organization cannot afford 
to ignore that need.  A well-run organization must, that is, allow for the possibility of 
middle manager led upward divergent strategic change while, for the most part, 
maintaining overall strategic discipline. 
The Importance of Research into the Microfoundations of Strategy Process 
My primary contribution in this dissertation is to bring to the middle management 
perspective on strategy process recognition of and theory about the implications of 
organizational and individual heterogeneity for our understanding of the middle 
management perspective on strategy process.  Despite the centrality of strategic change to 
strategic management as a discipline, little research has focused on the implications of 
strategic and individual heterogeneity for the processes of strategic change (Schmid, 
Floyd & Wooldridge, 2010; Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 2008).  We are, I submit, 
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approaching the limits of treating strategy process and managers as homogenous.  
Moving forward, our research will become narrower but also more realistic and 
predictive. 
This new focus on heterogeneity requires, in turn, a perspective that builds on the 
idea of the manager situated within the organization.  The emerging research stream on 
the microfoundations of strategy, on “the underlying individual-level and group level 
actions that shape strategy and the organization” (Eisenhardt, Furr & Bingham, 2010: 
1263), connects processes of strategic change, the research on which has mostly focused 
on the role of top management (Carpenter 2000), with the middle management 
perspective.  Microfoundations research gives us a more complete and richer 
understanding of the internal “cogs and wheels” of organizational level strategic change 
(Elster, 1989:3).  In particular, given the relatively limited coherence and cumulative 
impact of middle management research (Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 2008), bringing 
microfoundations research to the middle management perspective promises new insights 
on how organizational strategy is formed. 
Axioms I Bring to My Research 
Or, at least, so it seems to me.  Underlying all of these arguments and each of my 
papers are a few axiomatic assumptions that I bring to my research.  When I look for 
causal explanations of social phenomena, I tend to look at the level of individual 
cognition and behavior; I tend, in other words, toward a pragmatic methodological 
reductionism (Coleman, 1994) that leads me to seek to explain firm-level phenomena “at 
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the level of structure, behavior and laws1 of its component parts plus their relations” 
(Foss, 2011: 3; Silberstein, 2002: 81).  This leads to my first axiom:  an organizational 
level phenomenon cannot usually be causally explained by other organizational level 
phenomena, except as shorthand for well-understood underlying mechanisms (Abell, 
Felin & Foss, 2008; Coleman, 1994).  Researchers can seek to explain firm level 
phenomena – indeed, explaining organizational performance is the fundamental purpose 
of strategic management (Schendel & Hofer, 1979) – but firm level phenomena cannot be 
explained wholly in terms of firm level phenomena (Foss, 2011).  Organizations are, 
reductively, the people within their boundaries and their routinized interactions (Abell, 
Felin & Foss, 2008).  Thus, when I look for causal explanations for middle management 
led strategic change, I look first at the structure of the organization, by which I mean the 
people within the firm and their routinized interactions (Moran, 2005).  This leads to my 
second axiom:  group behavior is an emergent property of individuals interacting 
(Coleman, 1994). 
Bringing this reductionist approach to strategy formation, I adopt Abell, Felin & 
Foss’s (2008: 492) idea that “strategic management should fundamentally be concerned 
about [sic] how intentional human action and interaction causally produce strategic 
phenomena.”  I also build on the insights of Eisenhardt, Fur & Bingham, (2010), Lewin 
& Massini (2011) and Teece (2007) that organizational routines, defined as repetitive, 
                                                          
 
1 Of course, this being the social sciences, we must content ourselves with law-like relationships 
(Tsoukas, 1989). 
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recognizable patterns of interdependent actions carried out by multiple actors, are 
fundamental to both strategic stability and strategic change (Feldman & Pentland, 2003: 
95).  My qualitative paper, in large part, focuses on the interactions of individual 
heterogeneity with particular organizational routines in building organizational strategy. 
As this suggests, microfoundations research is inherently multilevel.  Although I 
am trying to explain a mechanism of strategy formation, an organizational level 
phenomenon, I focus on individuals embedded within structures – this is, indeed, the 
thread that ties my dissertation together.  Despite my focus on the individual as the 
fundamental component of the organization, I can still consider strategic differences 
between organizations.  Groups can act in ways that cannot be predicted from the 
intentions of the individuals within the group (Granovetter, 1978); group behavior is not 
merely the average of the intentions of the group’s members (Coleman, 1994).  This 
implies, however, that speaking of group intent, or mind, or memory, is a convenient 
shorthand for behavior emergent from the routinized interaction of individuals within the 
group, and should not be reified as existing separate from the group (Weick & Roberts, 
1993).   
It is for this reason – my reluctance to reify the group mind – that I reject the idea 
that strategy exists separate from the organization, formulated by top managers and 
implemented (or resisted) by middle managers (Guth & MacMillan, 1986; Huy, 2011).  
As already noted, our understanding of strategy must include what the organization does, 
not simply what it intends to do (Mintzberg, 1978).  Strategy emerges from the routinized 
interactions of individuals within and across organizations.  Middle managers can, 
through their own autonomous strategic choices, influence these routinized interactions, 
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thus influencing the course of organizational level strategy (Burgelman, 1983a; Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 2000).  Routines themselves, for example routine scanning of the firm 
environment, can lead to change (Feldman & Pentland, 2003).  Influencing strategy will, 
in turn, influence organizational performance, which makes upward/divergent strategic 
influence an important phenomenon for study. 
My Three Papers 
The balance of my dissertation is organized as follows.  In the first paper, which 
provides much of the theory motivating this dissertation as a whole, I develop a 
conceptual model of upward/divergent strategic influence (see Figure 1-2).  In this model, 
I use Miles & Snow’s (1978) strategy framework to characterize firm level strategic 
heterogeneity. The Miles & Snow strategy type indicates where the attention of top 
managers is focused.  For example, in a Defender, top management focuses on 
maintaining strict control of operational functions and promoting efficiency.  Top 
management is, in other words, focused inward.  This implies that a divergent middle 
manager who sees an opportunity not seen by top managers will be positioned 
structurally to receive information from outside the organization.  Seeing this opportunity 
will lead the focal middle manager to champion divergent strategy which leads, in turn, to 
strategy change.  However, the likelihood that a middle manager in the proper structural 
position given the firm’s strategy type will champion divergent strategy depends upon the 
middle manager’s ability to recognize the need for strategic change.  Because strong 
identification with the firm promotes relational concerns over instrumental concerns 
when managers make legitimacy judgments, middle managers with strong organizational 
identification resist divergent change because it threatens that relationship (Tost, 2011).  
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On the other hand, middle managers with weak organizational identification will not care.  
Moderate identification with the firm makes it more likely that a properly positioned 
middle manager will champion divergent strategy. 
Figure 1-2: A Model of Middle Manager Upward/Divergent Strategic Influence. 
 
My second paper is a qualitative study of middle manager led strategic change 
within a division of a large, high-tech company in the northeast (the “Division”).  I report 
on three attempts (two successful and one unsuccessful) by middle managers to champion 
organizational strategic change by directing the attention of top managers to strategic 
opportunities.  I use this research to build theory about the microfoundations of the 
attention based view (ABV) of the firm; specifically the role of individual middle 
managers in alerting the firm to strategic opportunities and threats.  The ABV is founded 
on the insight that top management attention is a valuable and scarce resources (Ocasio, 
1997).  Since top managers cannot watch all areas of strategic interest to the firm, I 
suggest that they rely, in part, on alerts from middle managers.  In particular, I examine 
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the question of how individual structural position and cognition is enlisted to supplement 
top manager attention.  I contribute to the strategy process literature (and specifically to 
both the ABV and middle management perspective) by using the tools of 
microfoundations research to work towards an attention based view of middle 
management, thus allowing for a richer and more textured understanding of the cogs and 
wheels of strategic change.  This paper focuses, in particular, on the how of middle 
manager strategic influence more than on the why (Ahearn, Lam & Kraus, 2014). 
My third paper is a network study of middle managers within the same firm as my 
second paper.  Forty-nine middle managers completed a complex survey of network 
relationships (formal, informational, advisory and social) and answered questions about 
their work.  They also nominated peers they perceived as able to influence organizational 
strategy.  This gives us the opportunity to quantify, using social network analysis, how 
their relationships and attributes are associated with strategic influence.  Although based 
on ego-networks and not a basis for generalization, this qualitative network study allows 
us both to understand in detail how a particular group of middle managers understand 
strategic influence, and to investigate which middle manager activities (integrating, 
facilitating, synthesizing or championing), what kind of information (about the 
environment or internal operations) and what network attributes are associated with 
strategic influence.  At least within these middle managers, this study confirms the 
importance of both personal attributes and structural position and the sometimes 
surprising way in which they interact. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE STRENGTH OF MODERATE IDENTITIES:  THE MICROFOUNDATIONS 
OF MIDDLE MANAGER DIVERGENT STRATEGIC INFLUENCE 
Preface to Paper One 
 There are solid theoretical (Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000) and empirical (Burgelman, 1994) 
reasons to conclude that middle managers provide important links between a firm’s formal 
strategy and its performance; that middle managers both manage the firm’s operations so that 
they conform to induced strategy and can also contribute to the overall direction of 
organizational strategy.  The empirical evidence, however, has been mixed (Wooldridge, Schmid 
& Floyd, 2008).  In this conceptual paper, I suggest a model of contingent middle manager 
strategic involvement that takes into consideration organizational and individual heterogeneity.  
This paper takes account of my “structure, cognition, behavior” model of contingent middle 
manager strategic involvement. 
Introduction 
The middle management perspective on strategy process has given us a deeper 
understanding of how firms change their strategy to improve the fit between their 
environment and internal capabilities.  Managing the firm’s strategy is top management’s 
core responsibility, but some firms are too complex for top managers, alone, to supply the 
necessary attention to all aspects of strategy.  Top management focus is often the limiting 
factor in growth and strategic change in complex organizations (Penrose, 1995; Simon, 
1997).  Middle managers take up the slack, supplementing top management attention and 
cognitive resources, primarily by coordinating functional strategy with organizational 
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strategy and conveying information up and down the organization and across 
organizational boundaries (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000), but at 
times by working towards “a redefinition of the organization’s mission and purpose or a 
substantial shift in overall priorities and goals” (Gioia, Thomas, Clark & Chittipeddi, 
1994: 364; Cornelissen, Holt & Zundel, 2011).   
Middle managers thus play a crucial role in strategy formation (Mintzberg, 1978; 
Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 2007), usually integratively (to coordinate dissimilar 
activities into a coherent organizational strategy) but sometimes divergently (to “alter the 
organization’s concept of strategy”).  Floyd & Wooldridge (1992) identified four middle 
management strategic roles using a two-by-two matrix defined whether the middle 
manager is focused up or down the organizational hierarchy, and whether the middle 
manager is working integratively with existing strategy or divergently.  In this paper, I 
explore the antecedents of upward/divergent strategic involvement aimed at a redefinition 
of firm strategy.   
This type of middle management strategic involvement is particularly interesting 
for three reasons.  First, the effects of upward/divergent strategic involvement are 
strategically disruptive.  Strategic coherence across the firm is performance enhancing 
and disrupting firm strategy harms performance (Nath & Sudharshan, 1994).  This 
implies that upward/divergent strategic influence threatens firm performance and should 
be avoided.  But upward/divergent strategic involvement can also be performance 
enhancing.  Burgelman (1994) examines Intel’s exit from the memory chip business as a 
performance enhancing divergent strategic change pushed by middle managers based on 
what they knew of the environment and Intel’s functional strategies.  Floyd & 
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Wooldridge (2000) illustrate upward/divergent strategic involvement using the fight of a 
middle manager at Data General Corp. (taken from Kidder, 2000) to substantially change 
the firm’s resources and goals by developing a new microcomputer contrary to the firm’s 
strategic plan.  Yet examples of upward/divergent strategic involvement (successful or 
unsuccessful) are rare in the empirical literature and we do not know how successful 
firms suppress performance threatening disruption from middle manager strategic 
involvement while allowing performance enhancing disruption. 
Second, as the Intel and Data General examples suggest, upward/divergent 
strategic change is also interesting because it marks an episode of discontinuous strategic 
change that is not initiated by top management, thus breaking our generally accepted 
paradigm of strategy formulation and implementation.  We think of organizational 
strategy as being legitimized by top managers; we seldom think of middle managers as 
strategic insurgents and certainly not in a good way (Guth & MacMillan, 1986). 
Third, upward/divergent strategic involvement is also interesting because of its 
implications about firm and manager heterogeneity.  Much of our research assumes 
(tacitly or explicitly) that firms are structurally and processually homogenous, and does 
not take into account the possibility that similarly situated middle managers might differ 
on their ability and propensity to engage in any of Floyd & Wooldridge’s (2000) four 
types of strategic involvement because of differences between their firms or themselves.  
In fact, firms can be quite heterogeneous in the ways in which middle managers are 
allowed to act strategically (Hart, 1992).     
What difference do these differences make, if any?  We know very little about the 
implications of firm and middle manager heterogeneity for strategy formation.  With 
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some exceptions (e.g., Mair, 2005), middle management research has not explored the 
strategy process implications of differences between organizational level strategy types 
(Miles & Snow, 1978) and among middle managers (Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 
2008).  In this conceptual paper, I explore the theoretical implications of firm and middle 
management heterogeneity for the firm’s strategy process by focusing on middle 
management led strategic change in complex organizations.  Because it is in this context, 
where the strategic changes are (by definition) largest that the effects of heterogeneity 
will be most pronounced. 
Specifically, I develop a cross-level model of how middle managers, managers 
located below top managers and above first-level supervision in the hierarchy 
(Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 2008), working upward and divergently (Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 2000) can influence the firm’s conception strategy (Burgelman, 1983a, 
1994).  I explore how organizational level strategic heterogeneity, based on Miles & 
Snow’s (1978) framework of strategic orientation, combined with middle manager 
heterogeneity in structural position and organizational identification affect the ability and 
willingness of individual middle managers to bring about organizational level strategic 
change.   
Different strategic orientations (in Miles & Snow’s (1978) typology, defenders, 
prospectors and analyzers) arise from the plans of top managers and path dependent 
elements of the organization’s history.  Each strategic type implies that top managers’ 
attention (a scarce resource, Ocasio, 1997) is most productively focused on particular 
areas vital to its strategy (in Defenders, internal operations, for example).  This implies 
that strategic opportunities and threats that arise in areas perceived as less important to 
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the organization will first be identified by lower level managers.  Because middle 
managers link organizational strategy with functional strategy, they will be among the 
first to notice if the organization’s formal and functional strategies no longer fit.  It is the 
middle manager who must integrate functional strategy with organizational strategy who 
is most likely to identify divergent opportunities or threats – those that require strategic 
change at the organizational level.  I also argue that a middle manager’s willingness to 
see the need for change and fight for it depends upon their level of organizational 
identification.  I develop these theoretical thoughts into formal propositions and propose 
a model of middle manager divergent influence.  In so doing, I contribute to the middle 
management perspective on strategy process and change (Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 
2010), and the emerging literatures on the microfoundations of strategic change (Abel, 
Felin & Foss, 2008; Eisenhardt, Furr & Bingham, 2010; Schmid, Floyd & Wooldridge, 
2010). 
Strategic management has long focused on organizational level predictors of 
organizational level phenomena, in particular the determinants of performance, but 
recently focus has started to shift towards micro level explanations (Floyd, Schmid & 
Wooldridge, 2010; Hoskisson, et al, 1999; Teece, 2007).  Organizational level 
explanations have been valuable in explaining variability in organizational performance, 
but macro level explanations are not causal explanations (Abell, Felin & Foss, 2008).  
Causal explanations often require micro level explanations of macro level phenomena 
(Eisenhardt, Furr & Bingham, 2010; Foss, 2011; Teece, 2007).  This new focus on the 
microfoundations of strategy allows, among other things, for consideration of both the 
social psychological basis for groups behavior and the heterogeneity of individuals 
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located within the boundaries of the organization (Coff & Kryscynski, 2011; Foss, 2011).  
These considerations add texture and nuance to our understanding of how middle 
managers contribute to the formation of organizational level strategy. 
The microfoundational approach is particularly apt for research on the middle 
management perspective on strategy process (Schmid, Floyd & Wooldridge, 2010).  The 
microfoundations approach focuses on individual level factors, which are necessary to 
explain why similarly situated middle managers have different levels of upward divergent 
strategic influence (Schmid, Floyd & Wooldridge, 2010).  Also, microfoundational 
explanations build on individual heterogeneity.  Though often ignored in the literature, 
both middle managers and the social structures in which they are embedded are 
heterogeneous.  That heterogeneity is central to my model of upward divergent strategic 
influence.   
Microfoundational work is, inherently, cross-level work.  Thus, this paper 
answers a call in the literature for increased multi-level theorizing (Klein, Tossi & 
Cannella, 1999).  Cross-level models, however, can be confusing and ambiguous to both 
researcher and reader, and must be carefully delineated to be useful.  I therefore have 
organized this paper around the generic microfoundational model developed by Abel, 
Felin & Foss (2008).  See Figure 2-1.  I begin by reviewing the middle management 
literature.  Moving to theory development, I focus first on the institutional level using 
Miles & Snow’s (1978) framework of strategy types.  Moving down to the individual 
level, I argue that relevant conditions of individual action, in this case brokerage roles, 
will differ based on strategy type.  Staying at the individual level, I then consider 
individual action, here championing strategic alternatives up the firm hierarchy.  I end my 
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theory development moving back to the institutional level, tracing how individual action 
leads to social outcomes, here strategic change.  Finally I discuss my contribution, the 
implications of my theory for both researchers and practitioners and suggest fruitful 
avenues for future research. 
Figure 2-1: A Generic Model of a Cross-Level Microfoundational Model  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Middle Management Perspective 
The defining characteristic of middle managers as a group is that they inhabit the 
middle of the organizational hierarchy, reporting to top management while supervising 
operating managers (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992; Schmid, Floyd & Wooldridge, 2010).  
This same pattern largely applies to individual middle managers, who are themselves 
both supervised and supervisors.  Their core function is to transmit information up and 
down the organizational hierarchy, across functional departments and sometimes across 
organizational boundaries in order to maintain coherence between the firm’s overarching 
strategy, its operations and its environment (Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 2008; Shi, 
Markoczy & Dess, 2009).   
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Most often, this is taken to mean that the job of middle managers is to integrate 
functional strategies into a coherent organizational level strategy formulated by top 
managers (Raes, et al, 2011).  In this case, the activities of middle managers are directed 
downward:  they use the logic of induced organizational strategy to shape functional 
strategy (Guth & MacMillan, 1986; Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000).  In other circumstances, 
however, middle managers work upward; their central aligning role either requiring them 
to report to senior management on changing conditions or allowing them to influence the 
course of organizational strategy to match functional strategy or a changing environment 
(Burgelman, 1994).    
While CEOs and top level managers approve, legitimize and maintain strategic 
cohesion across the organization and operating managers actualize organizational 
capabilities (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1996; Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 2008), middle 
managers, because of their (literally) middle position in the organizational structure 
mediating between top and functional managers, make the incremental day-to-day 
adjustments that allow adaptation to a changing environment (Burgelman, 1983b; Floyd 
& Wooldridge, 1996; Nonaka, 1994).  That is, middle managers as a group work both to 
integrate induced organizational strategy into the overall operations of the firm and to 
nurture new strategic approaches that diverge from existing strategy (Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 1996).  The range of middle manager strategic involvement (up/down, 
integrative/divergent) is illustrated in Figure 2-2, adapted from Floyd & Wooldridge 
(2000).  
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Figure 2-2: A Typology of Middle Management Involvement in Strategy,  
Adapted From Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992. 
 
This middle management perspective on strategy process has done much to flesh 
out Mintzberg’s (1978) insight that strategy is as much formed as formulated; that 
strategy is a pattern in a stream of decisions taken across the organization.  That middle 
managers are involved in strategy formation, that implementation is more than merely 
ministerial, is now widely accepted (Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 2008).  Case studies 
highlighting managers’ autonomous strategic activities (e.g., Kodama, 2005; Mantere, 
2008), as well as theory on how managers identify, champion and sell strategic issues 
upwards (e.g., Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000; Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Rouleau & Balogun, 
2011) have led to theory about middle manager strategic contribution that does not pay 
sufficient attention to the implications of middle manager and organizational 
heterogeneity (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, 2000).  It is not much of an overstatement to 
say that we have moved from an assumption that no middle manager can contribute 
productively to the direction of organizational strategy to an assumption that many 
middle managers actually do so.   
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This latter assumption, like the former assumption, is overly simplistic.  While 
working downward is not limited to “mere” implementation (Wooldridge & Floyd, 
1990), most middle managers spend most of their time seeking to keep disparate 
functions in line with organizational strategy.  Their formal authority flows from top 
management down to operations, meaning that middle managers working downward are 
empowered by both the formal levers of organizational authority and the less formal 
suasion that a more senior organizational member naturally has with more junior 
members (Rouleau & Balogun, 2011).  Working downward, in other words, is inherent in 
the position of manager and, while some middle managers are no doubt more experienced 
and more skilled than others, working downward is something that most managers do 
most of the time (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992; Guth & MacMillan, 1986).   
Reporting upward is similarly inherent in middle managers’ hierarchical position.  
“Reports”, after all, is a common synonym for subordinates.  Reporting can also 
constitute involvement in strategy (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992).  Those reports help top 
managers allocate resources and formulate formal or induced strategy (Osterman, 2009).  
Middle managers allow top managers to delegate secondary strategic tasks while 
focusing scarce mental resources (Simon, 1997) on the organization’s primary strategic 
issues. 
Working upward to change the direction of organizational strategy, on the other 
hand, is not inherent in the middle manager’s position.  Upward influence is as much 
dependent upon personal characteristics (e.g., discursive abilities and political skill) as on 
formal hierarchical position (Dutton & Ashford, 1983; Rouleau & Balogun, 2011).  A 
middle manager trying to work a change in organizational level strategy is, in effect, 
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overstepping his or her structural position by focusing on (in Miles and Snow’s (1978) 
terms) a primary strategic issue rather than a secondary issue.  An influential middle 
manager does not simply report, but must be able to persuade top managers to focus their 
attention on a perceived problem and adapt a proposed solution that fundamentally 
changes the organization’s deliberate strategy (Dutton & Ashford, 1983; Wooldridge & 
Floyd, 1992; Rouleau, 2005).  It is perhaps, then, not surprising that, although Floyd & 
Wooldridge (2000: 54) noted that almost everyone has a story of some important new 
initiative driven by a middle manager, upward divergent strategic involvement appears 
only rarely in the empirical literature  
Influential Middle Managers Tend To Be Boundary Spanning Brokers 
Middle managers who attempt to exercise upward divergent strategic influence 
must, first of all, work up; they must have access to top managers.  If they have access to 
top managers, they must then have access to divergent information; information 
indicating that the current organizational strategy no longer fits (or soon will not fit) the 
firm’s environment or functional strategy, as well as suggestions on how to shift the 
strategy in order to bring it back into environmental alignment.  This implies that middle 
managers who try to redefine organizational strategy will tend to occupy particular 
structural position within the firm that give them access both to top managers and to 
information not otherwise known to top management.  In other words, upward/divergent 
middle managers will tend to be boundary spanning brokers connecting otherwise 
separate networks across the divide between the organization and its external 
environment (Pappas & Wooldridge, 2007). 
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Middle managers as a group broker information between top managers and 
functional managers (what we might call vertical brokerage) and across organizational 
boundaries (horizontal brokerage).  That these boundary spanning roles lead to 
organizational innovation and performance is not controversial (Burt, 2005; Pappas & 
Wooldridge, 2007).  The middle manager perspective on strategy process has focused 
upon brokerage as an important factor in middle manager social capital (see the review 
and discussion in Shi, Markoczy & Dess, 2009).   
While middle managers as a group span boundaries, middle managers as 
individuals are heterogeneous in their structural position; some are brokers and others are 
not.  This observation leads to the possibility that middle manager structural 
heterogeneity will affect their strategic role.  Previous research has given us a typology of 
brokerage roles between non-overlapping subgroups (Gould & Fernandez, 1989).  Shi, 
Markoczy & Dess (2009) have taken these generic brokerage role and tied them to the 
Floyd & Wooldridge (2000) framework, arguing that particular brokerage roles will 
better suit some of the Floyd & Wooldridge activities than others.   Figure 2-3, adapted 
from Shi, Markoczy & Dess (2009), illustrates these various types of generic brokerage 
roles in the middle management context using triads in which middle managers connect 
two top managers, top managers with operating managers, two operating managers or 
top, middle or operating managers with another middle manager.  
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Figure 2-3: Middle Manager Brokerage Roles, Based on Shi, Markoczy & Dess 
(2009) 
 
According to Shi, Markoczy & Dess (2009), the three brokerages most likely to 
lead to upward/divergent strategic involvement are Cosmopolitan II, Liaison I and 
Representative middle managers, in each of which the focal middle manager brokers 
access to a top manager.  As Shi, Markoczy & Dess (2009: 1470) note, however, 
Cosmopolitan II brokers are unlikely to champion divergent strategies; rather a 
Cosmopolitan II broker provides a pre-implementation screen ensuring that members of 
the top management team share a single strategic intent. 
Middle managers in a Liaison I brokerage, on the other hand, directly connect a 
top manager with operating managers and more importantly organizational strategy with 
functional strategy (Shi, Markoczy & Dess, 2009).   Moreover, Liaison I brokers have a 
multitude of structural “holes” to fill, as hierarchical status and the institutional role of 
middle managers works in their favor with respect to operating managers.  That is, it is 
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unlikely that a link will develop directly between a low level manager and a high level 
manager; linking these hierarchical levels is a natural role for middle managers.  At the 
same time, this is a particularly valuable brokerage role.  Burgelman (1983a) found that 
operations are a fertile ground for strategic innovations.  Liaison I brokers, like the 
middle managers at Intel, can exercise upward divergent strategic influence by bringing 
divergent information from the functional levels of the organization to top managers in 
order to change organizational strategy to better fit functional strategy.  In this case, 
championing often requires issue selling, in that the middle manager must convince top 
management to pay attention to a functional issue, though here the issue is needed change 
in organizational strategy rather than additional resources or a change in functional 
strategy (Dutton, Ashford, O’Neill & Lawrence, 2001). 
Representative brokers connect a top manager with another middle manager.  
Representative brokers, too, can have a multitude of structural holes to fill, given that 
there are many middle managers to every top manager and that middle managers 
(although usually lumped together theoretically) can be found on numerous hierarchical 
levels in a complex firm.  As important, the link between middle managers in a 
Representative brokerage can cross internal firm boundaries, allowing the focal middle 
manager to bring information to the top manager to which he or she would not usually be 
exposed.  Tom West, the focal middle manager driving Data General’s development of a 
new microcomputer (Kidder, 2000) made a point of soliciting information from other 
departments of the company, including sales, to build his case to top management. 
Finally, although the Shi, Markoczy & Dess’s (2009) typology is a valuable 
contribution to understanding how middle managers contribute to organizational strategy, 
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it does require an extension.  Shi, Markoczy & Dess (2009) assume that individual 
managers affiliate with particular networks based on their organizational hierarchy level; 
that is that middle managers see themselves as different from low level managers and top 
level managers.  This is another way of assuming that middle managers are  homogenous 
other than for their structural position, and that one middle manager, assigned to bridge a 
particular gap, makes the same strategic contribution that would be made by any other 
middle manager in that same position.   
Because the hierarchical positions assigned to middle managers by the 
organization are intended to further the organization’s existing strategy, strategic 
influence will not arise from structural characteristics alone.  That is, strategic 
involvement or contribution might flow from formal organizational positions in a 
formulation/implementation model, but that very model curtails the opportunity for a 
middle manager to have strategic influence.   
More importantly, the eight brokerage types adopted to middle managerial 
structural position by Shi, Markoczy & Dess (2009) ignore what might potentially be the 
most important brokerage of all:  brokerage of information from the external 
environment.  Perhaps as an artifact of their reliance on the Gould & Fernandez (1989) 
brokerage typology, all of the sub-categories that make up the Shi, Markoczy & Dess 
(2009) typology are all internal to the organization.  Middle managers, however, can also 
bridge gaps between their organization and its environment (Burt, 2005; Pappas & 
Wooldridge, 2007).  Given the importance of both environmental fit and 
functional/organizational strategic fit to firm performance (Venkatraman, 1989), a middle 
manager with access to a unique source of environmental information (for example, to a 
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supplier, a customer, or an industry working group) might well be in a position to use that 
brokerage to influence organizational strategy.  One further type of middle management 
brokerage is thus necessary, the Diplomat brokerage (Figure 2-4).   
Without adding the Diplomat brokerage, the Shi, Markoczy & Dess (2009) 
typology does not allow for new information about the environment to enter the 
organization through middle management brokerage.  This is not only contrary to prior 
research showing new information being brought to the firm by middle managers (e.g., 
Burgelman, 1984) but would also suggest that, over time, all relevant information would 
circulate throughout the firm, with the result that there could be no more brokerage.   
The key to this brokerage role, and what differentiates it from the Shi, Markoczy 
& Dess (2009) brokerage types, is that it spans two different types of boundaries.  It 
spans a hierarchical boundary in that the middle manager links to a top manager but it 
also spans an organizational boundary.  The Diplomat is linked to another manager who 
can be of any hierarchical level, but must in a different organization.  Because the 
Diplomat is familiar with both a particular aspect of the firm’s functional strategy and 
must work to align that strategy with overall strategy, this brokerage role can be 
powerful.  For example, Intel’s exit from the memory chip business was based, in part, on 
information received by middle managers from managers at suppliers, including the 
makers of “fabs”, the machines that manufacture computer chips, managers who had 
previously worked for competitors, and from customers (Burgelman, 1994).  The 
information they brought to Intel made clear that Intel’s functional strategy (how it made 
memory chips) could not be squared with its organizational strategy (to allocate resources 
based on Intel’s return on investment), forcing strategic change.  My conception of the 
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Diplomat broker as an agent of divergent change is an amplification of Burgelman’s 
(1994: 49) proposition that:  “In dynamic environments, actions of middle-level managers 
that diverge from official corporate strategy may signal important changes in external 
selection pressures.”  I suggest that important changes in external selection pressure will 
lead middle-level managers linked to the external environment to champion actions that 
diverge from formal corporate strategy. 
Figure 2-4: A Middle Manager Acting as a “Diplomat” Brokers a Connection 
from a Manager of any Hierarchical Status Across an Organizational 
Boundary to a Higher Level Manager 
 
 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
In this section, I develop a model (set forth in Figure 2-5) detailing how the firm’s 
strategic type (Prospector, Defender or Analyzer) determines which brokerage position is 
most likely to lead to upward/divergent strategic involvement in that firm.  I then 
consider how other network characteristics of individual middle managers interact with 
their structural position to determine which managers are most likely to exercise upward 
divergent strategic influence on organizational level strategy for each strategy type.  Mine 
is, in other words, a contingent person-situation interactivist model in which the 
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“situation” is brokerage position within a firm’s internal network, the contingency is the 
firm’s strategic type, and the person is the focal middle manager.   
I first match brokerage roles with strategic type based on Miles & Snow’s (1978) 
strategy process framework.  Next, I argue that, even if located in the right brokerage role 
given the firm’s strategy type, a boundary spanning middle manager is not likely to 
exercise upward divergent strategic influence so long as that middle manager has a strong 
sense of organizational identification, such that the organization’s self-conception 
(Burgelman, 1994) merges with the middle manager’s self-conception, limiting the 
middle manager’s cognitive ability to recognize the need for change because the potential 
change challenges the manager’s relationship with the firm (Ren & Guo, 2011; Tost, 
2011).  Such middle managers are unlikely to try to redefine firm strategy because their 
self-conception leads to biases, assumptions and presuppositions about the correct 
organizational strategy (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994: 563. 
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Figure 2-5: A Person-Situation Interactivist Model of the Microfoundations of 
Middle Management Upward, Divergent Strategic Influence. 
 
Organizational Level Heterogeneity Effects the Structural Position of Divergent 
Middle Managers 
An organization’s articulated purpose is its overarching strategic logic, or 
organizational level strategy.  Its “established mechanism” for achieving its purpose is its 
operating or functional strategy.  As Miles & Snow (1978) recognized, purpose and 
mechanism are interdependent, each shaping the other.  Management’s strategic choices 
shape the organization’s structure and process while at the same time structure and 
process constrain strategy (Burgelman, 1983a; Miles & Snow, 1978: 7).  In other words, 
organizational strategy shapes functional strategy, but functional strategy can also shape 
organizational strategy.  It is the foundational role of this adaptive cycle in Miles & Snow 
(1978: 21) that makes it an apt frame for considering upward divergent middle 
management led strategic change. 
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The mutual constraint imposed by the adaptive cycle suggests that organizational 
and functional strategy must be coordinated, a task that falls largely to middle managers 
(Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992).  No strategy can succeed that is beyond the power of the 
organization’s operations nor is there value in operations that do not serve the firm’s 
strategy.  Unless they are to be completely static, strategy and operations must continue 
to co-evolve in an adaptive cycle (Burgelman, 1983b; Mintzberg, 1978).  Thus, the 
interdependence and iterative development of any given organization’s solutions to the 
entrepreneurial problem (what should be the firm’s overarching strategy, given its 
capabilities and environment), the engineering problem (what capabilities does the firm 
need to execute its strategy within its environment), and the administrative problem (how 
does the firm continue to evolve to meet new challenges while maintaining overall 
strategic coherence) (Miles & Snow, 1978). 
The administrative problem is, through the lens of the middle management 
perspective, the coordinating role played by middle managers between organizational 
strategy and operating strategy (Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000).  Middle managers are the 
link between top management and operating management, which means that they are also 
the link between organizational strategy and operating strategy.  In short, middle 
management strategic involvement allows the coordinated evolution of the firm’s 
strategies and capabilities to better fit an evolving environment (Burgelman, 1983b, 
2004; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997).  The relationship between the engineering and the 
entrepreneurial problem varies across organizations, and thus the administrative problem 
varies as well.  Miles & Snow (1978) reduced this variance to four archetypal 
organizations, Defenders, Prospectors, Analyzers and Reactors.  Because strategic 
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orientation and top manager attention differs across these archetypes, the nature of 
middle manager integrative and divergent strategic involvement will also differ between 
Defenders, Prospectors and Analyzers,2 as set forth below and summarized in Table 1-2.  
The core of my argument here is that top management focus differs across these 
archetypes and, thus, middle management focus – and the structural position of middle 
managers championing divergent strategic change – also differs across the archetypes. 
                                                          
 
2 Following the examples of both Miles and Snow (1978) and Floyd and Wooldridge (2000), I do 
not analyze the middle manager role in Reactors, who in effect do not have coherent answers to 
the entrepreneurial and engineering problems. 
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Table 2-1: Middle Manager Integrative and Divergent Strategic Involvement by 
Miles & Snow (1978) Strategic Type. 
 Defender Prospector Analyzer 
Organizational 
Strategy 
To "seal off" a portion of the 
market, allowing for a stable 
set of products and customers 
over time. 
To locate new products and 
market opportunities. 
To locate new products and market 
opportunities while simultaneously 
maintaining a stable and protected 
core market of traditional products 
and customers. 
Functional 
Strategy 
To run the day-to-day 
operations of the firm as 
efficiently as possible, 
through the use of stable and 
established technology, a 
tendency towards vertical 
integration, and continuous 
incremental improvement. 
To avoid long-term 
commitment to a single 
technology, using multiple, 
flexible technologies and a 
low degree of routinization. 
To be efficient in the stable 
portions of the organization's 
operations while being flexible in 
the new or changing portions. 
Top 
Management 
Focus 
Top management focuses on 
operational efficiency and 
protecting the firm’s niche 
from new entry. 
Top management focuses on 
the search for new markets 
and new capabilities.   
Top management focuses on 
quickly entering new markets 
pioneered by Prospectors while 
using financial controls to ensure 
efficiency in its core operations. 
Integrative 
Role of Middle 
Managers 
Managerial attention at both 
the top and middle is directed 
inward and downward rather 
than outward. 
Middle managers must focus 
on working downward to 
integrate diverse operating 
strategies into a coherent 
organizational level strategy. 
The peculiar challenge for middle 
managers in an Analyzer is to 
enforce the segregation of 
functional strategies between core 
functions and new ventures. 
Divergent Role 
of Middle 
Managers 
Proposing based upon 
information from across the 
organizational boundary that 
the firm modify its functional 
strategy, move into a related 
market or change its core 
product 
Proposing based upon 
limitations in functional 
strategy that the firm exits an 
established market. 
Proposing based on information 
from new ventures that the firm 
change a core product or exit a 
core market (e.g., Burgelman, 
1994). 
Likely 
Brokerage 
Position for 
Divergent 
Middle 
Managers 
Diplomat (divergent strategy 
based upon information from 
across an organizational 
boundary) 
Liaison I (divergent strategy 
based upon information 
about functional strategies) 
Representative (divergent strategy 
in core market based upon 
information from a new market) 
 
Defenders produce a narrow range of products within a protected market niche.  
Their main strategy focus is on maintaining stability in their strategy, processes and 
environment while avoiding competition.  Performance for a Defender is the result of 
maintaining its price level while decreasing its costs.  It does this by working at an 
industry level to protect its niche, mostly by maintaining government restrictions to entry 
while working internally to improve the efficiency of its operations (Efrat & Shoham, 
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2013). Because Defenders value stability, the scope for upward divergent middle 
manager strategic influence is inherently limited (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992).   
Given the nature of Defenders, top managers focus their attention on the two keys 
to firm performance:  limiting competition in their niche and on working to drive 
inefficiencies out of the firm.  Top management pays little attention to other firms, since 
they are not a key to success.  Middle managers, on the other hand, must pay attention to 
other firms and thus must pick up the cognitive slack.  In Defenders, it is the middle 
manager who is most likely to learn of new improvements elsewhere that can be adopted 
to the firm’s functional strategy, new markets aligned with the firm’s niche, or new 
features that might be added to the firm’s core product.  Because of the nature of 
Defenders, this information is more likely to come from outside the firm than from other 
functional departments within the firm.  For this reason, middle managers in Diplomat 
brokerages are most likely to have the combination of external information and internal 
knowledge allowing them to suggest upward/divergent strategic change.  Of course, 
given the nature of Defenders, this effort will rarely succeed.  Thus, top managers are 
willing to cede this role to middle managers because they know that Defenders will 
usually ignore events outside their existing domain, implying that middle managers will 
have limited ability to upset strategic coherence  
Proposition 1:  In Defender organizations, upward/divergent middle management 
strategic involvement is more likely from those managers occupying Diplomat 
brokerage roles in the firm than from managers in other brokerage roles or with 
no brokerage role. 
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Prospectors occupy the opposite extreme of a strategic continuum from Defenders 
(Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992).  Prospectors are continually looking to use their existing 
resources and capabilities to enter new product markets and exploit new environmental 
opportunities (Miles & Snow, 1978).  Thus, firm performance for Prospectors is tied to 
finding new markets for the Prospector to explore while exploiting its existing resources.  
Because of the importance of new markets to firm performance, top managers focus 
outside the firm, looking for new opportunities to exploit and new technologies to adopt.   
For Prospectors, change is predictable and top managers assume that middle 
managers will have to adapt regularly to new environments and new technologies.  The 
importance of change causes Prospectors to seek functional flexibility by avoiding 
routinization and long term commitments to a single technology (Bentley, Omer & Sharp, 
2013).  This puts a heavy burden on middle managers, who in their primary integrative 
roles must focus on promoting coherence in the midst of flexibility.  Given a regularly 
changing product mix across the firm, middle managers must integrate the firm’s diverse 
products and technologies into an overarching strategy.  As a result, in Prospectors most 
middle managers will focus on their integrative role as Liaison II brokers – a middle 
manager connecting a top manager with an operating manager.  What it Defenders is a 
key role of top managers, assuring operational efficiency, is delegated to middle 
managers in a Prospector while top managers focus on finding new market niches, a role 
all but irrelevant to top managers of Defenders.  Because top managers are already 
looking to make connections with the external environment, middle managers in a 
Diplomat brokerage are unlikely to influence organizational strategy because they are 
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unlikely to be the first organizational member to come across new information from the 
external environment. 
Because, on the other hand, top managers in Prospectors are not overly concerned 
with efficiency in functional strategies, which after all will soon change, they are willing 
to delegate authority over internal routines to middle managers while focusing on the 
environment.  Any new information with strategic relevance will, most likely, come first 
to the attention of a middle manager brokering the link between functional and top 
managers, a Liaison I broker.  In a Prospector, divergent middle manager behavior is 
more likely to arise from a Liaison I brokerage using information from operations to 
change organizational level strategy.  For example, Data General’s development of a new 
microcomputer (Kidder, 2000) is an example of a middle manager realizing that internal 
operations could support development of a new strategy (direct competition with Digital 
Equipment Corporation) that top management did not support. 
Proposition 2:  In Prospector organizations, upward/divergent middle 
management strategic involvement is more from those managers occupying 
Liaison I brokerage roles in the firm than from managers in other brokerage roles 
or with no brokerage role. 
Analyzers combine certain characteristics of Defenders and Prospectors.  The 
bulk of their profits come from a few established market niches in which, Defender-like, 
they have stable operations and routines, but they also actively look for opportunities to 
follow Prospectors into new markets.  Top managers in Analyzers focus on the 
environment in their search for new opportunities for ventures, but unlike Prospectors, 
they are content to be second-movers, allowing Prospectors to identify new niches (and 
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take the concomitant risk).  Like Defenders, and unlike Prospectors who accept 
somewhat chaotic functional strategies, Analyzers enforce internal efficiency using strict 
financial controls to monitor the firm’s core activities.  Unlike Defenders, of course, they 
are always looking to move into a new (but not unproven) market.   
Analyzers are more risk averse than Prospectors while being more willing to take 
a risk than Defenders.  They tend to require more rigorous analysis before making a 
strategic change.  They are thus more dependent on middle managers than either 
Prospectors or Defenders, but those middle managers are expected to focus on the 
particular part of the organization they inhabit.  That is, Analyzers do not want their new 
market products to affect their Defender-like established businesses (Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 1992).  Instead, Analyzers rely on integrative middle managers to maintain 
strategic coherence by separating their Defender-like processes from their Prospector-like 
processes.   
As a result, top managers in Analyzers are paying attention to both the external 
environment and to the efficiency of the firm’s internal processes.  Indeed, integrating 
functional and organizational strategy – usually a core middle management function – is 
in Analyzers a matter to which top managers pay attention, using strong financial controls 
to enforce both efficiency and a separation of the firm’s different businesses.  
Nevertheless, there will be middle managers who can broker information between the 
Analyzer’s different businesses.  A divergent middle manager in an Analyzer is likely to 
be a Representative broker using information from one side of the firm (i.e., the 
Defender-like exploitation business or the Prospector-like exploration business) to 
champion strategic change in the other side, breaking the separation top managers value. 
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Consider, for example, a firm with a dominant position in a business-to-business market 
that expands into a related consumer market.  The firm realizes that the product must 
change to better suit consumers’ needs, but wishes to prevent change in its Defender-like 
commercial market.  A Representative middle manager who sees that a particular change 
made in the consumer market would also be beneficial in the commercial market would 
need to engage in upward divergent strategic behavior to change the firm’s commercial 
strategy. 
Proposition 3:  In Analyzer organizations, upward/divergent middle management 
strategic involvement is more likely from those managers occupying 
Representative brokerage roles in the firm than from managers in other 
brokerage roles or with no brokerage role. 
Influential Middle Managers Have Only Moderate Identification with Their 
Organizations 
Propositions 1 through 3 (and Table 2-2) set forth my argument that, depending 
upon strategy type, Liaison I, Representative and Diplomat brokers are more likely than 
other middle managers to recognize strategic opportunities or threats not seen by top 
managers and engage in upward/divergent strategic involvement.  But these structural 
circumstances will not have a direct effect on divergent strategic change; the opportunity 
is there in the form of divergent information but the ability to recognize that opportunity 
might not be.  If strategy is the pattern in a stream of decisions (Mintzberg, 1978), then 
upward divergent strategic influence depends upon the willingness and ability of middle 
managers to disrupt that pattern.   
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For the reasons set forth above, this is often structurally difficult – whatever the 
organization’s strategy type, a middle manager who sees a strategic opportunity or threat 
and champions a change in strategy will be doing so from a source top management 
believes is not critical to organizational strategy.  But it is difficult for another reason; a 
middle manager seeking to change the organization’s concept of its strategy is also 
seeking to change the organization’s concept of itself and what it does; that is, its 
identity.  A small change will not be problematic, and even a large change can be 
justified retroactively (Burgelman, 1983a), but a large change in strategy can also be a 
large change in identity, and people resist changing their identity.  Some middle 
managers will not only be reluctant to change the organization’s identity but will, as a 
result of cognitive bias, be unable to see the need for change (Ren & Guo, 2011).  A 
middle manager strongly committed to the organization’s current identity will be 
emotionally primed not to press for divergent change, even if that middle manager 
occupies the right kind of brokerage role to affect strategic change given the 
organization’s strategy type.  An upwardly divergent middle manager must, in other 
words, not only be positioned to see the need for change but must also be willing to 
concede that need.  As a result, the relationship between brokerage role and strategic 
influence will depend upon the emotional valence the organization’s identity has for a 
given middle manager (Burgelman, 1994).3 
                                                          
 
3 To successfully exercise upward divergent strategic influence, a middle manager must also be 
politically adept.  This important point is sufficiently developed in the middle management 
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This ability to see the need for change will be compromised in managers 
committed to maintaining the organization’s existing identity.  Organizational 
identification has important cognitive effects on managers (Ren & Guo, 2011; Tost, 
2011). Organizational identification, the sense of belonging to an organization (Mael & 
Ashforth, 1992), reduces subjective uncertainty about our own and other people’s 
perceptions, attitudes, feelings and behaviors, and ultimately about our self-concept and 
place within the organization.  Uncertainty reduction is a core human motivation (Hogg 
& Terry, 2000), which implies in turn that organizational identification is a key driver of 
our understanding of our place in the world, how we should behave in a given situation 
and how we can expect others to behave.  Strong organizational identification can lead to 
biases, prejudices and presuppositions that effect the manager’s evaluation of the 
legitimacy of divergent strategic alternatives (Dukerich, Golden & Shortell, 2002; Tost, 
2011).  As a result, middle managers might reject possible opportunities because they do 
not align with the existing strategic orientation of the firm (Ren & Guo, 2011).  
Organizational identification can be homogenizing or isomorphic forces that leads to 
conformity within the organization.  A strong organizational identity helps promote 
strategic coherence but also leads managers to resist strategic change. 
Though there is a long and active literature noting the importance of 
organizational identification for both the organization and the individual embedded 
                                                          
 
literature (e.g., Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000; Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 2008) that I will not 
belabor it here but will treat it instead as outside the scope of this paper. 
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within the organization (see Ashforth, Harrison & Corley, 2008: 326 for a review of this 
literature), what has perhaps not been noted is the overlap between organizational 
strategy and organizational identity.  Strategy is what the firm does, and what the firm 
does forms its identity.  Of course, in order for a strategic change to trigger this type of 
bias, it must be sufficiently large to threaten the organization’s identity in the minds of 
middle managers.  I am simplifying my theoretical context by assuming that the line 
between integrative and divergent strategy is also the line at which managers can 
rationalize a change in terms of existing strategy (integrative) or find it threatening 
(divergent), but it seems likely that the bigger the change, the greater the threat. 
Burgelman (1994: 41) focuses on managers’ emotional attachment to memory 
chip manufacturing as the foundation of Intel’s success as part of the inertial force that 
stopped Intel from exiting that business as soon as it should have done.  Managers across 
the organization, including Gordon Moore, thought of Intel as “the memory chip 
company.”   One middle manager compared Intel’s decision to get out of the memory 
chip business to “Ford deciding to get out of cars.”  Another said that the time leading up 
to the exit was emotional and that “it was difficult to be rational.”  Ansoff (1979: 188) 
noted that strategic change is cultural change and that cultures resist change.  CEOs are 
so closely intertwined with existing organizational strategy that they often resist needed 
strategic change and must be replaced before firm’s can implement disruptive strategic 
change (Tushman, Newman & Romanelli, 1986). 
If CEOs fear that their self-identity will be undermined by a major change in 
organizational strategy to the extent that they dismiss or ignore warning signs of 
impending environmental change (Bouchikhi & Kimberly, 2003), middle managers are 
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no better off.  Middle managers, no less than CEOs, identity with their firm and build 
their self-identity around organizational strategy.  Middle managers, who are assigned 
specific duties and responsibilities by senior management, are structurally constrained in 
the strategic focus.  Even those middle managers who see the warning signs of impending 
change may ignore those warnings because they are as resistant to fundamental change to 
the organizational level strategy as they would be to fundamentally changing their self-
identity (Ren & Guo, 2011).  
Because top managers are so identified with organizational strategy and because 
middle managers are closer to customers and suppliers, who often see new opportunities 
first (Teece, 2007), it is critical for the organization to have at least a few middle manager 
brokers with only moderate organizational identification.  (Middle managers with low or 
no organizational identification might see the need for change, but not act on that need.) 
This might seem somewhat at odds with research suggesting that motivation depends 
upon inculcating employees with the organization’s “norms, value and culture” (Coff & 
Kryscynksi, 2011).  We must be careful, however, not to conflate organizational 
identification with commitment to the organization or motivation to work for change.   
Organizational identification is conceptually and empirically distinct from related 
micro-organizational constructs, such as organizational commitment.  Riketta’s (2005) 
meta-analysis comparing organizational commitment and organizational identification 
found that these were two distinct constructs.  Commitment correlates more closely with 
job satisfaction, intent to remain and absenteeism, while identification correlates more 
closely with organizational citizenship behaviors and job involvement.  In other words, a 
middle manager with only moderate organizational identification is not necessarily an 
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uncommitted manager, a lazy manager or poor manager.  Instead, he or she is simply a 
manager who has not linked his or her organizational membership to his or her self-
concept (Herrbach, 2006: 630; Riketta, 2005: 361). This relatively weak identification 
implies that the cognitive biases tied to organizational identification are also moderate 
(Mukherjee & He, 2008; Riketta, 2005).   
Thus, a middle manager with only moderate organizational identification will be 
less threatened than other middle managers by the possibility of organizational change, 
and more willing to judge possible change instrumentally.  This implies that the 
relationship between brokerage role and strategic influence is dependent upon 
organizational identification, and that this dependence is curvilinear.  Even if correctly 
placed, a middle manager with high emotional valence on organization identity will not 
be able to conceive of strategic change; a middle manager with very low emotional 
valence on organizational identity will not care.  Upward divergent middle managers will 
tend to have organizational identification somewhere in the middle. 
Proposition 4:  The relationships between brokerage type and upward/divergent 
middle management strategic involvement set forth in Propositions 1, 2 and 3 
depend upon organizational identification in a curvilinear relationship such that 
middle managers in the proper brokerage role for their organization’s strategy 
type (i.e., Defender/Diplomat, Prospector/Liaison I, Analyzer/Representative) are 
less likely to engage in upward/divergent middle management strategic 
involvement if their identification with their organization’s current strategy is low 
or high and more likely to engage in upward/divergent middle management 
strategic involvement if their organizational identification is moderate. 
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Discussion And Conclusion 
In this paper, I delineate the theoretical “cogs and wheels” (Elster, 1989: 3) 
underlying a particular type of middle management led strategic change.  I suggest that, 
in order to understand the contributions middle managers make to organizational level 
strategy formation, we must understand the circumstances in which middle manager 
strategic involvement takes different forms.  Focusing on upward divergent strategic 
influence, I suggest that organizational and middle manager heterogeneity help predict 
which middle managers are likely to influence organizational level strategy. 
This heterogeneity comes in two types:  structural and personal.  Depending upon 
the organization’s strategy type, middle managers in Liaison I, Representative or 
Diplomat brokerage roles are more likely than other middle managers to try to redefine 
organizational strategy.  Personally, middle managers who have relatively moderate 
organizational identification, and thus are more likely to see gaps between organizational 
level strategy, on the one hand, and the environment or functional strategy, on the other 
hand, are more likely than other middle managers to engage in upward divergent strategic 
influence. 
The strengths of this approach are the strengths generally arising from the 
movement to study the microfoundations of strategy.  As discussed above, even empirical 
work on the middle management perspective tends to assume, implicitly or explicitly, 
that middle managers are largely homogenous, that the tools of strategy formation are 
equally available to all, and that any given middle manager is as likely to work upward as 
downward, and to work divergently as integratively.  Once we relax this assumption of 
homogeneity, our models of middle management strategic activity become at once more 
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realistic and more granular.  Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd (2008) began their review of 
the middle management literature by noting that the middle management perspective has 
not developed as a coherent or cumulative body of theory when compared to other 
strategy process perspectives, particularly the top management team perspective 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  One possible explanation for this phenomenon may be that 
not only has the top management perspective explicitly dealt with heterogeneity within 
top management teams (Alexiev, et al, 2010; Carpenter, 2002), but that middle managers, 
who are much more numerous than top managers, are also more heterogeneous than top 
managers, not only in terms of structural position but also in terms of the demographic, 
functional and background factors shown to be relevant to performance (Van 
Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). 
I have also contributed to our nuanced understanding of the roles played by 
middle managers in strategy development.  As these roles (synthesizing, championing, 
integrating and facilitating) have developed, there has been little attention paid to the 
antecedents of each role separately.  In other words, why is a focal middle manager likely 
to participate in one type of strategic activity but not in the others?  How do the roles 
differ in the knowledge needed for one rather than another?  These questions, which are 
tied to issues of individual and organizational heterogeneity, are explicated in this 
research.  It is generally recognized that we need to bring individual heterogeneity into 
our understanding of middle managers strategic involvement (Wooldridge, Schmid & 
Floyd, 2008), but this is true not only as to which middle manager will work to effect 
strategy, but also as to which role a particular middle manager will use. 
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This paper thus contributes to our understanding of the microfoundations of 
strategy and to the middle management perspective on strategy process. The 
microfoundations of strategy literature is relatively recent (Abel, Felin & Foss, 2008; 
Foss, 2011; Teece, 2007) and I contribute not just an additional model of another 
strategic phenomenon, but also a way of thinking about microfoundations rooted in the 
person-situation perspective of social psychology.  Similarly, I contribute to the middle 
management perspective not only a new model of upward, divergent strategic influence, 
but also a new, more particular and granular way to think about middle managers, the 
relevant distinctions between individuals, and how they contribute to strategy formation 
that is still positivist and generalizable.  Finally, I contribute to our understanding of 
strategic human capital by modeling particular set of “cogs and wheels” by which 
heterogeneous human capital leads to a change in organizational level strategy.   
The great strength of this model, its particularity, is also its weakness.  This is not 
a theory that explains, or purports to explain, all of strategic change or even all the ways 
in which middle managers are involved in strategy.  There are at least three more sets of 
causal mechanisms leading from opportunity to organizational exploitation in the Floyd 
& Wooldridge (2000) typology, not to mention the mechanisms for turning opportunity 
into performance that are not specific to the middle management perspective.  Even here, 
the general form of my model – seeking causal explanations in the combination of 
structural and personal heterogeneity – might be useful in guiding future research into 
other types of strategic change. 
My model has other implications for future research.  First, as noted, it opens the 
way for future theory explaining the causal mechanisms leading to other types of middle 
  
49 
 
management strategic involvement, as well as other types of organizational level strategic 
change.  At the same time, the idea that strategy process literature generally and research 
on the middle management perspective specifically, should focus on individual level 
explanations of organizational phenomena – that is, the microfoundational project – 
suggests a number of fertile areas for future empirical research.  To fully understand the 
microfoundations of strategy, we need qualitative research, and particularly grounded 
theory (Eisenhardt, 1989), to show us what these “cogs and wheels” look like in situ and 
how they are experienced by the middle managers involved.  Qualitative work will, in 
particular, give us greater insight into the political dimensions of upward/divergent 
strategic behavior.  On the other hand, because strategy is, as a field, largely aimed at 
positive and generalizable explanations of organizational phenomena, there is a real need 
for quantitative research that can help explicate individual level actions.  The important 
role played by structural position and brokerage roles might indicate that network 
analysis will play a particularly important role as this research advances. 
This model also has implications for practitioners.  Whether strategy formulation 
in a particular organization is centralized or decentralized is itself an important strategic 
choice.  As Hart (1992) observed, performance suffers at both extremes; where middle 
managers have no role in strategy formulation and where they have too much strategic 
influence.  At least in part, my microfoundational model explains this phenomenon; 
strategic innovation can come from the core or the periphery; foreclosing the possibility 
of either limits that organization’s strategic options.  Similarly, my model suggests a path 
to performance enhancing strategic change that might strike practitioners as 
counterintuitive.  It is valuable to have influential middle managers who are not wedded 
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to current strategy; in moderation, dissenters are productive because they can see what 
top and middle managers who are more identified with the organization will not see.  
Where the organizational identification literature sees high levels of identification as 
good, I suggest a particular situation in which weaker identification is good. 
In conclusion, I wish to comment on how this paper, and more generally 
microfoundational explanations of organizational phenomena, fit into the existing body 
of strategic management research.  As I noted above, strategic management has generally 
been focused on the organizational level.  Our characteristic dependent variable, 
performance, is an organizational level variable and most of our explanations of 
performance have also been at the organizational level.  There is, on the other hand, a 
temptation and tendency to understand microfoundational explanations as being solely 
focused on the individual level.  Certainly, the microfoundations project is both reductive 
and based on methodologically individualism (Abel, Felin & Foss, 2008).  But it need not 
be entirely reductive, nor is methodological individualism the same as normative 
individualism.  That is, microfoundational explanations can be found at levels other than 
the individual level (Foss, 2011), in particular at the level of routines and (as this paper 
demonstrates) structure (Felin & Foss, 2009; Teece, 2007).  Rather, the aim of 
microfoundational research in strategy is to reduce our explanations to a fundamental 
level, which might be the individual, team or group, but might also be a routine or 
structure.  My aim in this paper is to help build towards a fundamental understanding of 
strategic change, rather than an understanding of how individual’s act within 
organizations. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THAR SHE BLOWS!  MIDDLE MANAGERS AND THE 
MICROFOUNDATIONS OF THE ATTENTION BASED VIEW OF THE FIRM 
At the beginning of his foundational paper on the ABV, Ocasio (1997: 187) 
quotes Simon (1947: 100-101) for the proposition that “[o]rganizations and institutions 
provide the general stimuli and attention-directors that channelize the behaviors of the 
members of the group.”  Simon (1947) knew better than most of us, however, that 
organizations and institutions, at least directly, do no such thing.  Routines established 
within organizations and, ultimately, the members of the organization (particularly the 
top managers) both direct attention and pay attention.  This dual emphasis on 
organizational structure and individual cognition and behavior are at the core of the ABV 
(Ocasio, 1997: 188).  What organizations do depends upon what top managers direct; 
what top managers direct depends on the issues upon which they focus; the issues upon 
which they focus depends upon their context and situation; and their context and situation 
depends on the firm’s structure, particularly rules, routines and networks.   
Because of this link between top manager attention and strategic decision making, 
empirical and theoretical work on the ABV has tended to focus on a strong bi-directional 
connection between what the firm does well and where the attention of top managers is 
focused (Maula, Keil & Zahra, 2013; Ocasio, 1997, 2011; Kilduff, Elfenbein & Staw, 
2010; Marcel, Barr & Duhaime, 2010; Cho & Hambrick, 2006).  This lead in turn to the 
observation that firms tend to promote from their core functional areas and those CEOs 
continue to view the firm’s strategy through that functional lens (Michel & Hambrick, 
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1992; Burke & Steensma, 1998).  In other words, at the organizational level, we can say 
that firms appear to act where they focus and focus where they act. 
This has been a valuable insight into what we might consider firm-level attention 
(Ocasio, 2011).   It has led researchers to recognize the importance of alert mechanisms 
that break the firm out of this attention loop and moves its focus to important new 
developments in their environment.  As a result, researchers have identified a number of 
specific alert mechanisms that draw the attention of top managers to areas of strategic 
importance to the firm, including venture capital (Maula, et al., 2013), regulation (Cho & 
Hambrick, 2006), technological change (Kaplan, 2008), and large-scale societal changes, 
such as health care reform (Nigam & Ocasio, 2010).  These alert mechanisms tend to be 
at an organizational level and tend to be exogenous to the firm, perhaps because the 
attention based view has tended to conflate TMT attention with organizational attention 
(Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Ocasio, 2011).   
To those who approach the ABV from a strategy process orientation, however, 
these exogenous alert mechanisms are problematic; not because they do not exist – they 
undoubtedly do – but because firms cannot rely solely on their environment to alert them 
to environmental change.  Environmental scanning is a key organizational process central 
to incremental strategic change (Teece, 2007).  Environmental scanning is fundamental to 
the ongoing monitoring of the firm’s environment/strategy/structure coalignment process 
(Vankatraman, 1989).  The “firm’s” attention cannot simply be fixed on the relatively 
small number of particular areas that top management (alone) can scan continuously; 
there is no guarantee that the next disruptive innovation will come from some expected 
source.  Indeed, part of what makes an innovation disruptive is that it is not expected; it 
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comes from left field.  To take one example, top managers in the recording industry were 
likely not following developments in digital file compression algorithms or tcp/ip 
protocols for wide area networks until shortly after people started sharing MP3s over the 
Internet, although likely some middle managers were aware of what was going on, 
regardless of whether they understood the implications.  A strategy process that did not 
alert top management to this disruptive environmental change is a sub-optimal strategy 
process.   
In other words, firms cannot assume that top managers can choose to monitor that 
slice of the macro-environment that will turn out to be relevant.  Rather, firms need to 
incorporate a mechanism for directing the attention of decisions makers to areas in the 
firm’s environment that have become (are becoming) relevant.  Moreover, given the 
practical and theoretical limitations on TMT size (Azason & Sapienza, 1997) and all of 
the contending matters that the TMT must pay attention to, it seems unlikely that the 
TMT, alone, can scan the firm’s environment.  This is the domain of strategy process 
and, in particular, of strategic renewal, the idea that performance is positively associated 
with mechanisms that move strategically relevant information through the organization so 
that it can make small incremental evolutionary changes to its strategy over time, rather 
than react suddenly to unexpected discontinuous change (Dess, et al, 2003). 
In this paper, I begin to describe this sort of mechanism:  an alert system for 
focusing top management’s attention on areas that are becoming relevant.  This system is 
not exogenous to the firm, but rather is contained within the firm.  Borrowing both from 
the middle management perspective (Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000) and from the related 
experiences of actual middle managers, I suggest that firms use middle managers to pay 
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attention to those areas outside the focus of the TMT and to alert top managers if 
anything happens within the purview of the middle manager that requires their attention 
(Ren & Guo, 2011; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992). 
 Based on interviews with middle and top managers at a high tech company 
located in the Northeastern United States, I sketch out a mechanism for scanning the 
environment and alerting top managers to relevant change.  This mechanism starts with 
individual middle managers whose structural position gives them a “view” of the external 
environment not focused on by top managers.  Using the tools of “synthesizing” and 
“championing” (Floyd & Woodridge, 1992), these middle managers alert top managers 
of the need to shift their focus.  Top managers can then decide whether to adjust the 
firm’s strategy.   
In my conception of this mechanism, middle managers, based upon their 
structural position within the firm and their own cognition, are like look-outs on a 
whaling ship tasked with shouting out to alert the Captain when they spot a whale.  Just 
as lookouts free the Captain from constantly scanning the horizon for whales, this 
mechanism allows the TMT to focus on the most promising or critical area, confident that 
any unseen change will soon be called to their attention. 
Through this research, I aim to add texture and nuance to our understanding of the 
ways in which top management attention can be refocused through the actions of middle 
managers.  In so doing, I hope to enrich two theoretical streams.  The first, the ABV, does 
not thus far include a study of how organizational structure and internal communication 
allow top managers to focus on one or a few areas because, if something happens outside 
of their focus, their view will be drawn to it by lower level managers.  At the same time, I 
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hope to enrich our understanding of the middle management perspective on strategy 
process, which suggests that middle managers are involved in the formation of 
organizational strategy (Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 2007), but which has had little 
success in discovering the mechanisms by which this happens.  Focusing on individual 
heterogeneity (Foss, 2011) and middle manager attention based effects (Ren & Guo, 
2011), I begin to exhume the “cogs and wheels” of both middle manager strategic work 
and the attention based view (Elster, 1989:3).   
In what follows, I briefly trace the argument for more microfoundational research 
into strategy process (Schmid, Floyd & Wooldridge, 2010).  I also summarize the 
literatures on the attention based view and the middle management perspective.  Finally, I 
recount my qualitative findings, identifying what might be key characteristics of the role 
middle managers play in making sure that no part of the organization’s environment – 
even those held by top managers as being a low priority – is ignored.  I end with a 
discussion of the implications of my findings and suggestions for further research. 
The Microfoundational Approach to Strategy Process 
Although the attention based view of the firm is theoretically established at the 
organizational level, little empirical work has been done at the individual level (below the 
level of the TMT) tying individual cognition, structural position and behavior to where 
the “firm” focuses its attention.  Microfoundational work seeks to explain firm-level 
phenomenon of interest “at the level of structure, behavior and laws of its component 
parts plus their relations” (Foss, 2011: 3).  Before we can have a macro level causal 
explanation for a given phenomenon, we must understand the micro causes upon which 
that phenomenon is founded (Abell, Felin & Foss, 2008).  We can seek to explain firm 
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level phenomena – indeed, explaining organizational performance is the fundamental 
purpose of strategic management (Abell, Felin & Foss, 2008) – but firm level phenomena 
cannot be explained wholly in terms of firm level phenomena (Foss, 2011).  
Organizations are, reductively, the people within their boundaries and their routinized 
interactions (Abell, Felin & Foss, 2008).  Thus, the explanation for strategic change can 
only be found in the structure of the organization, the behavior of managers and their 
psychological biases, plus their routinized interactions (Moran, 2005). 
Bringing this reductionist approach to the attention based view, I adopt Abell, 
Felin & Foss’s (2008: 492) idea that “strategic management should fundamentally be 
concerned about [sic] how intentional human action and interaction causally produce 
strategic phenomena.”  I am looking for a cause of organizational level strategic change 
using “cogs and wheels” (Elster, 1989: 3) located at the individual level of actions and 
interaction of individual middle managers (Abell, Felin & Foss, 2008; Foss, 2011).  
Qualitative methods are well-suited to this type of research because I am focused on 
individuals and their subjective understanding of the firm’s environment and because I 
am only starting to work towards generalizable theories of the individual foundations of 
firm attention.  I should also note that I did not start this research looking for the 
mechanisms behind the ABV.  Rather, only after my attention was called to these 
particular episodes through the iterative process of qualitative data analysis did I realize 
what I had seen. 
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Theoretical Background 
The Attention Based View of the Firm and the Middle Management Perspective on 
Strategy Process 
While CEOs and top level managers approve, legitimize and maintain strategic 
cohesion across the organization and operating managers actualize organizational 
capabilities (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1996; Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 2008), middle 
managers, because of their position in the organizational structure mediating between top 
and functional managers, make the incremental day-to-day adjustments that allow 
adaptation to a changing environment (Burgelman, 1994; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1996).  
That is, middle managers as a group work both to integrate induced organizational 
strategy into the overall operations of the firm and to nurture new strategic approaches 
that diverge from existing strategy (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1996).  If the domain of top 
managers is organizational strategy and the domain of operating managers is functional 
strategy, then the domain of middle managers is aligning functional strategy with 
organizational strategy (Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 2008).  We can, in other words, 
think of middle managers from an ABV perspective as potential extensions of the TMTs 
attention down through the firm.  A middle manager who seeks advancement – which is, 
to be sure, not all middle managers – might seek to attract top managerial attention, 
which is a scarce resource and thus must be “paid for”, by attempting to demonstrate his 
or her strategic ability. 
As I have noted, little research into the ABV has paid attention to the organization 
below the TMT.  Rather, research into the ABV has been at the organizational level, 
focusing either on the TMT or on exogenous alert mechanisms, or both (Cho & 
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Hambrick, 2006).  This focus on organizational level attention, however, is not inherent 
in the ABV.  While recognizing that the TMT is critical to the firm’s attention regulation, 
Ocasio (1997: 197, 200) expressly observed that middle managers could be both players 
(individuals and groups who “affect the firm’s attention regulation through the specific 
skills, beliefs, and values they bring to the firm”) and decision makers (participants in the 
“enactment of the environment and the social construction of organizational moves”).  
The middle managers, for example, who allocated Intel’s chip making resources across 
its product lines were, in this sense, decision makers (Burgelman, 1994).   
What is it, then, that middle managers do that is strategically relevant and how do 
these activities alert top managers to the need for strategic focus?  Floyd & Wooldridge 
(1992) identified four strategic activities of middle managers:  they implement functional 
strategies that cohere with organizational strategies; they facilitate change in functional 
strategies as strategic needs change; they synthesize current developments with 
organizational strategy in their reports to top managers; and they champion new 
organizational strategies to top managers as they see the need for them.  It is the latter 
two activities – synthesizing and championing – that potentially alert top managers to the 
need for change.  Synthesizing can be thought of as reporting that current strategy 
requires some incremental move; championing can be thought of as reporting that current 
opportunities or threats (external or internal) require a new strategy. 
Ren & Guo (2011), working expressly to draw from both the ABV and the middle 
management perspective, theorize that firm structure, among other things, channels 
middle management attention to strategic opportunities that align with the firm’s existing 
strategic orientation.  They argue, in effect, that synthesis is the only middle management 
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alerting mechanism.  They use this insight to suggest propositions about which middle 
managers, given their structural position within the firm, will see particular opportunities.  
They argue that due to bounded rationality, “middle managers cannot pay attention to all 
available initiatives; they notice some initiatives while ignoring others” (Ren & Guo, 
2011: 5).  This is, more or less, my point about top managers although, since there are 
always fewer top managers than middle managers, the danger of top managers missing 
some relevant development is often greater.  Ren & Guo (2011) speculate that middle 
managers are more likely to notice available initiatives consistent with the firm’s strategic 
orientation, those inconsistent with the firm’s orientation are more likely to be 
overlooked.   
Based upon my empirical research, I take a somewhat broader view than Ren & 
Guo’s (2011) conceptual approach.  I suggest that firms have multiple mechanisms 
regulating attention.  In my research site, which I will refer to as the “Division”, the role 
of the formal strategy review – pitched as a way for middle managers to bring new 
strategic initiatives to top management – played very much the role envisioned by Ren & 
Guo (2011).  This process was used to channel middle manager attention into the firm’s 
existing strategy.  But the firm also has other mechanisms by which middle managers 
could bring to top managers strategic opportunities outside of the firm’s existing strategy.  
It is on these latter mechanisms that I focus.   
Specifically, I focus on three episodes of middle managers embedded within the 
Division calling attention to changes in the firm’s environment.  These changes were 
happening in areas not historically important to the firm (for example, changes in the 
consumer market where the firm has previously sold only to businesses).  One of these 
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episodes led to major strategic change (Greiner & Bambri, 1989: 68).  In another, the 
firm changed incrementally, deciding to invest resources to explore an opportunity 
brought to it by a middle manager.  In the third, the middle managers failed to convince 
the TMT to change.  Using these episodes, I explore qualitatively the actions of middle 
managers who shift the focus of top managers.  In so doing, I explore the 
microfoundations of the ABV by looking at both individuals and their structural position.   
Research Method And Context 
Research Background 
Qualitative methods are particularly well-suited to microfoundations research, 
particularly where, as here, the research is exploratory and designed to help build theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; van Dijk, et al, 2011).  Micro approaches necessarily focus on 
individual heterogeneity in situation and disposition in order to explain the causes of 
macro level phenomenon (Abel, Felin & Foss, 2008; Schmid, Floyd & Wooldridge, 
2010).  Qualitative research methods similarly focus on individual experience and can be 
used to understand both the implications of individual heterogeneity and how managers 
embedded with the organization understand their assigned role and how it meshes with 
their actions (Rouleau & Balogun, 2011).  Qualitative methods also bring to the fore 
issues of individual interpretation and sensemaking, which are critical to our 
understanding of how particular middle managers recognize and capitalize on divergent 
strategic opportunities (Eisenhardt, 1989; van Dijk, et al, 2011). 
I conducted semi-structured interviews during the summer and fall of 2009 in a 
recently acquired division of a $17 billion high-technology firm headquartered in the 
Northeast. The data presented here draw from interviews with four senior (C-level 
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managers reporting directly to the Division’s CEO) and eight middle level managers 
(those managers with access to top managers and knowledge of operations (Schmid, 
Floyd & Wooldridge, 2010)).  The Division assigned a middle manager to me as a 
liaison; he would arrange interviews for me with other managers at the Division, 
explaining that the research was being conducted with the knowledge and support of top 
management.  My liaison was also a useful informant in putting roles in context within 
the structure of the Division.  Because of the way in which interviews were arranged, and 
because they took place at the Division headquarters during working hours, informants 
generally set aside on hour for our meeting.  Although this limited the time for any one 
interview, multiple interviews were possible and conducted with two informants. 
Interviews were digitally recorded (I have approximately 10 ½ hours of recorded 
interviews) and then I transcribed them into document files.   The digital interviews and 
the transcripts were entered into ATLAS.ti software, and coded.  I coded the interviews 
by subject matter first and used those codes to organize my research material around 
topics.  After approximately half the interviews were completed, I suspended active 
interviewing in order to pursue a period of iterative theory development based upon the 
then-completed interviews and archival and public information about the Division 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  At this point, I recoded moving from topics to theoretical constructs.  
Interviewing then recommenced.  After all of the interviews were completed, I recoded 
once more.  In this third coding, I was able to arrange my research material around the 
theory and model presented here. 
Informants were drawn from the Division’s four functional departments 
(Products, Marketing, Technology and Operations).  I interviewed each of the heads of 
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the four functional departments, with the balance of the interviews comprised of two 
managers from each department.  The middle managers I interviewed spanned the 
Division’s managerial hierarchy, from “Directors” who directly supervise operating 
managers to “Vice Presidents” who report directly to top managers.  All told, at the time 
of my research there were approximately 200 middle managers at different locations 
around the world.  Following completion and transcription of all interviews, the interview 
data was organized sequentially to produce a timeline of the key events in the evolution 
of the Division’s strategy.   Examining the data in this way allowed us to identify 
incidences of middle management lead strategic change and associated managerial 
activities.   
I did not undertake this research seeking to prove (or even develop) theories about 
the attention-based view.  Instead, I conceived of this research – and, indeed, still 
conceive of it – as part of a multi-site, multi-organizational, international study of the 
antecedents of middle management strategic involvement in evolutionary strategy 
renewal.  My initial goal, which turned out to be somewhat naïve, was to identify 
entrepreneurial middle managers, interview them to discover what made them 
entrepreneurial and then develop generalizable and testable theory about the antecedents 
of middle-manager involvement in corporate entrepreneurship.  To that end, I asked each 
of my informants to identify episodes of corporate entrepreneurship within the 
organization and to identify middle managers who were reputed to be entrepreneurial.  
What I found was neither entrepreneurs nor entrepreneurship, but a system in which 
middle managers embedded in an organization worked episodically to change 
organizational strategy. 
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Site Background. 
The Division was founded as an independent company to exploit patented data 
security technology discovered by its three academic founders.  At the time of founding, 
the patent belonged to the University that employed the founders.  Shortly after the 
founding, however, the University voluntarily gave up the patent and it became public 
domain.  Nonetheless, the Division continued to be an industry leader, maintaining its 
place as the foremost developer of technologies based on the former patent.  Partly 
because of its history, and partly because of its sponsorship of an annual industry 
conference, the Division sees itself and is seen by analysts as influential in setting the 
industry agenda. 
The Division was acquired by its current parent, a leader in a closely related 
hardware industry, in 2006.  After the acquisition, the Division’s incumbent management 
largely remained in place, including the CEO.  Over time, however, the parent has moved 
its own managers into key positions within the Division.  At the time of my research, 
three of the four heads of the Division’s functional departments came from the parent.  
The Division’s last CEO remained in place, and site has largely been given autonomy to 
form its own strategy (indeed, some of our informants, including carry-over managers, 
complained that the Division’s strategy was not sufficiently coordinated with the parent 
to realize all possible gains from synergy).  One of my informants, a senior middle 
manager in Marketing two hierarchical levels below the CEO, explained that the 
Division’s brand and industry leadership were a large part of its value to the parent in the 
acquisition, and it would thus have been irresponsible not to maintain its separate 
identity. Managers have, however, been told that success of the acquisition depended 
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upon quadrupling annual sales to approximately $1 billion by 2011, a goal the Division 
did not achieve.  All of my informants mentioned this goal and stressed its importance, 
some referring to it as the Division’s “strategy.”  Although the Division did not achieve 
this goal – missing relatively narrowly – it continued to be responsible for an outsized 
portion of its parents profits, based upon its relative sales.  In other words, its profit 
margin has traditionally been high.   
My research is focused on the Division’s strategy from 2005, just before the 
acquisition, to 2009.  This was been a period of change for the Division, including selling 
itself to its new parent.  During this period, the Division made or considered a number of 
major strategic changes, three of which are reported on here.  Two of these changes were 
strongly opposed by top managers; one failed and one was adopted.  The third was 
developed by a coalition of middle managers acting under cover of very general 
instructions from top management, but careful to stay outside of the Division’s formal 
strategy review process.  Throughout my interviews, the purpose and effectiveness of the 
formal strategy review was a major area of controversy.  As an academic observer, it 
appeared to me that middle managers saw the formal strategy review as a chance to 
champion divergent strategic change and judged it, overall, a failure while top 
management saw it as a means of enforcing strategic conformity and judged it a success.  
At least two of my top management informants were aware of this dichotomy. 
Alerting And The Division’s Formal Strategy Review 
The annual formal strategy review is intended to settle the Division’s “strategy” 
for a rolling period of three years.  It thus seems like a good candidate for an internal 
alerting mechanism and, indeed, when I began my research at the Division I focused on 
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the formal strategy process as the most likely source of incremental strategic change and 
strategic renewal (Dess, et al, 2003).  This would be consistent with Ren & Guo’s (2011) 
theorizing:  middle managers alert top managers to opportunities consistent with the 
firm’s formal strategy.  Practice turns out to be somewhat more complicated. 
The issues with the formal strategy process, as presented by my informants, are 
multifold.  Both middle and top managers consider the formal strategy review flawed, 
with one C-level manager claiming that strategy process at “successful companies are 
really designed to kill new ideas.”  Communication of the outcomes of the strategy 
review is purposely limited.  Middle and operating managers are frustrated because they 
contribute to the process, but do not know how decisions are arrived at.  If their 
suggestions are not adopted, they feel that their work was wasted.  Top managers suggest 
that time spent thinking about strategy is not wasted, but top management is interested in 
incremental change. 
Further, as noted above, all of the managers I spoke with are focused on the goal 
of getting the Division to $1 billion in annual revenue (a goal that the Division has not 
yet attained as of 2013).  At the time of the acquisition, this goal was, implicitly, a 
demand that the Division grow at approximately 20% per year.  A C-level executive in 
operations, who had spent much of his career at the parent before coming to the Division, 
suggested that the goal was more aspirational than fixed (“we are challenging ourselves.  
Will we get there in three years, will we get there in four years, nobody knows yet.  But if 
you don’t set it out there and having something that ….  That leads into the 
entrepreneurial spirit, the innovation)”, but that senior management was purposely not 
telling this to more junior managers.  This is characteristic of the Division, which 
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multiple informants (including two C-level managers) told us chooses not to 
communicate specifics of long-term strategy to middle and operating managers. 
One thing the focus on growth has done is focus the Division on growth through 
acquisition, rather than organically.  As one informant, “Alice” – a middle manager with 
a strong reputation at the Division as an “entrepreneur”– told me, entrepreneurship in the 
Division is through acquisition.  In part, this is because money spent on truly innovative 
new products will likely only make small differences to revenue whereas acquisitions can 
make a major impact.  As a top manager responsible for developing new technology 
explained, it makes no sense to develop disruptive technology in-house; a new product 
will be too small to matter to a large company and the money would be more 
productively spent winning marginal sales of existing products.  The better route to new 
disruptive products is to wait for them to survive their entrepreneurial phase 
independently and then buy them:  “the environment inside the building isn’t as harsh as 
outside the building, so you’re likely to have worse ideas not getting winnowed.” 
At the same time, “Bob”, a middle manager who prides himself on having a 
strategic mindset told me that the Division has a “veto culture” where the support of 
many people in the strategy process is necessary to move forward with an acquisition but 
only one “no” can kill it.  Another senior middle manager (“Carl”) noted that the Division 
did value innovation and welcomed new ideas, “but at the lower levels, employees don’t 
know where to go with ideas [that is, who to present new ideas to].  Ideas are only as 
good as the group thinks they are.  Anyone can stop an idea with one objection.”  Bob, 
who partially explains his inability to “sell” four different strategic changes “because I’m 
tapping into the wrong social network” also notes that an acquisition has to go through “a 
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dozen committees, the membership of which is composed of 10 people … each of which 
has a chance to say no and stop something.” 
Alice, the entrepreneurial middle manager, is scathing about the formal process:  
“My honest opinion?  It’s a bunch of bull shit…  It’s … it’s … I mean, I’ve worked on 
the strategy team every year, so has everybody else, and they get all psyched … because 
there’s cool things you can do and then the executive management never does anything 
with it.  And then, you know somebody in executive management have a really nice 
meeting with somebody from some other … company and goes, ‘we should acquire 
them.  They’re awesome.’  And that’s how it goes.”    Alice makes a point of avoiding the 
formal strategy review; Bob has four times tried to get approval for an acquisition 
through the formal process and has four times been denied. 
In sum, many top and middle managers consider the formal review process to be 
primarily a budgeting exercise, in which the budget for the next year is locked in, and 
preliminary budgets for the two following years are developed.  Most of the middle 
managers I spoke with were either frustrated with the formal strategy review, or were 
unaware of it.  Top managers saw the process as a way to make sure that new strategies 
aligned with existing strategy; the purpose of the process in their view was to enforce 
strategic orthodoxy.  Overall, both top and middle managers were cynical about the 
process; one senior middle manager told us, after noting that the process happens in the 
summer, that the joke at the Division is, “it’s July; time to innovate.”  None of the three 
episodes of middle manager strategic involvement resulted from the Division’s formal 
strategy development process. 
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The formal strategy review thus operates, in part, as an alerting mechanism.  
Middle managers and other people who are not members of the top management team 
have a chance to present strategic opportunities that align with the Division’s formal 
strategy.  This is very much a resource allocation exercise (which might help explain the 
perception that it is a budgeting rather than strategy process).  Top management picks the 
ideas that seem to offer the best returns in light of current strategy.  It is important to note 
that the resources being allocated include top management attention.  A C-level 
operations manager told me that “I’ve heard lots of feedback, where people say, ‘oh you 
made me do all this work.’  Yeah, but that was the intent, think about it….  It doesn’t 
mean your idea wasn’t a good idea, it’s just not something that we’re going to focus on 
right now.”  The formal strategy review is an alerting mechanism, but a limited one.  Top 
managers want to see what opportunities middle managers can bring to them, but in 
practice choose to focus on those that align with current strategy.  It is not that middle 
managers do not process opportunities outside of formal strategy; they are asked to “think 
outside the box.”  But the purpose is to find those opportunities that are worth top 
management attention. 
Three Episodes Of Middle Manager Alerting 
The First Episode:  Betting Your Job. 
The first episode of middle manager alerting led to the most dramatic change in 
the Division’s strategy.  It is not too much to say that, as a result of this episode, the 
Division underwent a Kuhnian (1962) paradigm shift in which some senior managers 
could no longer function.  Fittingly, the episode ends with a high stakes boardroom 
showdown, in which two sides square off to control the future of the Division.   
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From its founding, the Division’s primary business was to sell specialized 
computer security hardware into a business environment.  Its mission, as legitimized by 
top management and assimilated by middle management, had been to provide the best 
possible product.  Many of our informants across the Division discussed its commitment 
to making the best possible product, and some were upset at the perceived loss of that 
commitment as a result of this episode.  This commitment to be the best was a matter of 
pride at the Division that can perhaps be traced to its academic roots.  Once strategy 
changed, the Division saw itself primarily as a software supplier with a legacy hardware 
business and supplied products “good enough” to satisfy its customers’ needs. 
The origins of the change came from top management, who wanted to exploit its 
existing hardware by selling into consumer markets without changing the fundamental 
product.  This assignment was handed off to lower level managers, on the assumption 
that, given the high quality of the product, growth in the consumer market would be a 
simple matter.  This assumption was characterized, after the fact, as “ludicrous” or 
“absurd” by three informants, an indication of how fundamentally the Division’s self-
image had shifted once top managers shifted their focus to the consumer sphere. 
The middle manager who alerted top managers to the crisis developing in the 
consumer market (“Dan”) had started his career at the Division in Marketing.  Dan was 
the second marketing person hired when the Division’s total revenue was approximately 
$50 million.   He had an MBA degree and previous experience at high-tech start-ups. 
When the Division started to move into the consumer sphere he was tasked with finding 
partners to help in reconfiguring the hardware for consumers.   
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Dan was soon involved in three vertical boundary crossing conversations; that is, 
conversations across the organization’s boundaries.  First, in negotiating with potential 
joint venture partners, he discovered that the margins available to the Division in moving 
into the consumer space would be very low, with much of the value appropriated by the 
joint venture partner.  Second, while talking to a salesperson, he found that the Division 
was losing most orders it sought to place because of customer resistance; it could not sell 
the idea of using hardware in the consumer space.  Third, he found that a number of 
relatively small start-ups were having some success with software solutions that, while 
competing with the Division’s products, were (as the Division saw it) of unacceptable 
quality.  At the same time, a variety of regulatory changes had greatly increased the size 
of the consumer market.  To Dan, it was obvious that the Division should acquire a 
competing software company and fundamentally change its product offering in the 
consumer space. 
This solution, however, was incompatible with top management’s focus on 
providing the best possible solution.  Specialized hardware allowed the Division to 
supply its business customers with a very high quality solution; much higher than his 
conversations were showing to be necessary for the consumer space.  A software solution 
would necessarily mean a lower quality product, but conversations with customers 
suggested that the higher quality was not valued by consumers and that the convenience 
of a software solution, which could also be implemented online, was much more 
valuable.  The dominant coalition, which saw the Division’s mission as “best possible” 
quality, was unwilling to countenance selling a product that was less than the best 
possible solution.   
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There were, however, two exceptions to this opposition.  Once alerted, the CEO, 
who was relatively new and came from a financial rather than technical background, 
favored the move to software products, as did an executive reporting directly to the CEO 
brought in to manage the move into the consumer space.  Despite this support, top 
managers in the dominant coalition insisted on a showdown in front of the board of 
directors.  The night before the board meeting, the CEO said that they had better want the 
acquisition, because they were betting their jobs.  Before the presentation, his boss told 
him that this would either be the best day in his career or the worst.  “You’re on your 
own.  You’ll either make it and take over my job, or you’ll be gone shortly.”  The board 
sided with the CEO and the acquisitions moved forward; shortly after, a C-level 
executive and several senior middle managers left the company.  Even years afterwards, 
the fight over these acquisitions were still echoing in the Division; without rehearsing the 
history, one junior middle manager (four levels below the CEO and supervising operating 
managers) complained that the Division used to be committed to the best possible 
product, but now people “were more revenue focused than tech focused.” 
The Second Episode:  Skunk Works 
The second episode I studied can be considered a failure, as the product in 
question was never marketed, but nonetheless it did refocus the attention of senior 
managers.  This is an episode about persistence, about working around the system, and 
about being a high-maintenance employee.  It is also an episode that shows the 
difficulties of refocusing when top managers are focused on rapid revenue growth. 
The origins of this episode are located outside the organization.  Three engineers 
employed by the Division including Alice were all enrolled in a part-time MBA class.  
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They were asked as a class exercise to develop a new product and present a business case 
for that product.  Working together, the three engineers leveraged the Division’s 
hardware product into an innovative new product aimed, as it happens, at the consumer 
space.  (Episode two takes place several years after episode one.)  They then sought 
support within the Division to actually develop this project.  In this project, the managers 
were trying to leverage the Division’s internal resources to offer a new product into its 
existing markets. 
Given Alice’s skepticism about the formal process, it is not surprising that she 
bypassed it.  Instead, she “pestered” senior management to let her work on developing the 
product.  Ultimately, she was told by a C-level manager that, if she could demonstrate 
customer interest, she would be allowed to develop the product.  The C-level manager – 
also one of our informants – later admitted that he had not expected her to succeed.   
Indeed, working through the Division’s sales and marketing network, however, 
she was not able to make any progress.  Other managers and outside salespeople were not 
eager to help her without knowing that the project had a sponsor in top management.  
Finally, she used a personal network outside the organization (through an arts community 
she was involved in) to arrange a meeting with a senior manager at a potential customer.  
When she returned from this meeting, she met with the C-level manager to discuss the 
customer’s expression of interest.  When the CEO walked past the conference room, the 
top manager invited him in, saying “you’ve got to hear this.”  The CEO immediately 
authorized her to work on project development full time.  She and her team continued to 
meet with the CEO quarterly and met all of the goals they were given, including a goal to 
find an external customer willing to pay for the product development in return for 
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exclusive rights to the product for a limited time, another goal that top managers assumed 
she would not be able to meet.   
Nonetheless, the project was canceled.  According to our C-level informants, the 
potential returns to developing this product were large relative to the money spent, but 
not certain and not large compared to the Division’s existing revenue or its goal of 
aggressive growth.  In effect, the team’s unexpected success in finding outside 
development money had, ironically, the effect of dooming the product; the members – 
who as one top manager said, were able to sell a piece of paper for hundreds of thousands 
of dollars – were too valuable to waste on speculative product development.  Top 
management decided that managers that skilled were better used on bigger projects. 
Bob, who was not directly involved in the project, used it as an example of why 
the only way to innovate in the Division is by “skunk works”; that is, by keeping a 
project in development away from top managers.  This project had become too visible.  
Nevertheless, Bob supported the decision to close down the project.  He argued that no 
internal development process can be as effective in winnowing innovation as the market; 
for this reason it is better to buy new product innovation by acquiring start-ups who have 
had some success.  This raises an interesting aspect of middle manager alerting:  middle 
managers are vying for top management attention for their own good as well as for the 
good of the company.  Advancement can come through attracting attention (of course, 
only if the attention is the right type of attention).  In this project, this dual purpose – 
alerting as a means of influencing organizational strategy and alerting as means of 
advancement – worked at cross-purposes.  Alice wanted to “sell” top management a new 
product; what she ended up selling was the value of Alice.  Her cross-boundary 
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connections, which allowed her to see the opportunity for a new product, also resulted in 
her personal advancement even though her project was doomed. 
The Third Episode:  Timing Is Everything 
The third episode, also prompted from outside the Division, is perhaps most 
notable for the reluctance of the participants to take credit for the idea.  This reluctance is 
particularly interesting given the dual purposes of middle manager alerting discussed 
above:  both to influence strategy and also for personal advancement.  Five of the people 
I interviewed, one top manager and four middle managers (all of whom but one reported 
directly to C-level managers), were directly involved in the episode.  Each said that one 
of the others was primarily responsible, and each denied being themselves responsible.  It 
is clear, however, that wherever the idea came from, Alice was the main driver.   
The project was suggested by a third-party, a company that dominates a critical 
computer hardware market (Burgelman, 1994).  This company suggested that there could 
be synergies in selling a product combining aspects of its own products, the Division’s 
products, and the parent’s products.  This project was given to Alice, who had received a 
promotion as a result of episode two.  She solicited ideas from across the company for 
new products, which were then winnowed by the outside partner.  She purposely did not 
use the annual strategy review. 
According to Alice, much of middle management strategic leadership is 
execution.  She is not, she says, an idea person.  Her skill is execution; she is able to take 
a creative idea and manage creative people while finding solutions to obstacles.  Her 
talent, she says, is that when she runs into a wall, she finds a way around it.  She also has 
personal experience in start-ups, working from a young age in two high-tech companies 
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founded by a family member.  Her expectation is that she will ultimately “flee” the 
Division for a start-up, although on the other hand the Division has kept her this long by 
giving her interesting projects working with “brilliant” people.  She notes that she hated 
working at the Division when she started; she hated the “gray cubicles” and had never 
worked in a large company before.  Her solution was to remake the department in which 
she was working – as an engineer, not a manager – in the image of a start-up.   
Much of what she describes as execution is putting together the right team.  This 
includes her boss, who is “brilliant” but isolated from the rest of the Division.  It also 
includes Carl, who she describes as the most political person she knows, in the sense of 
being sensitive to site politics.  She brought him onto the project to “deal with legal” in 
getting clearance to sell software that had not gone through the formal development 
process.  When she was unable to get cooperation from the product development teams, 
she went to a professional services department typically charged with writing software 
for particular customer projects, bypassing the formal hierarchy.  When the three 
companies involved were unable to negotiate a timely nondisclosure agreement, she 
convinced technology managers in the other two organizations to proceed with an oral 
agreement before the NDA was fully negotiated and signed.   
At the same time, because of her reputation as an entrepreneur, she was during 
this period contacted by the CEO’s office and asked about interesting new products to be 
highlighted in a scheduled major speech by the CEO.  In answer (quite literally alerting 
top management to a change in the firm’s environment), she lobbied to make this project 
the subject even though it was “vaporware” (that is, it didn’t yet exist).  This publicly 
committed the Division to the product.  Ultimately, the Division released more publicity 
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statements about this project than any other single project in its history.  Again, Alice’s 
contacts across the Division’s hierarchical boundaries were key.   
This project resulted in a new product that completely bypassed the “product 
killing” formal development process.  When I asked what her reward was for pushing 
execution of this project, she was unable to give an answer that she found convincing.  
Ultimately, she said that it allowed her to help her boss and show how brilliant he was.  
She denied that it was money and resisted the idea that the process had been “fun.”  She 
suggested that personal satisfaction had been part of the potential reward in episode two, 
but not in episode three because the project was not her idea. 
Theory Development:  Middle Managers And  
The Attention Based View Of The Firm 
Trying to draw lessons from my research, I begin to see how middle managers 
can be key to the attention based view of the firm.  The fundamental insight behind this 
view is Simon’s (1997) treatment of managerial attention as a scarce resource.  This 
scarcity is ameliorated to some extent by having a top management team able to bring to 
bear more attention than any single executive has to spare.  But the TMT is, by nature, of 
limited size and increasing size can reduce efficiency (Amason & Sapienza, 1997).  The 
firm can rely on exogenous alert mechanisms, but by their very nature those mechanisms 
are problematic in that they will not “alert” top managers until they present a problem 
that must be addressed. 
I suggest, instead, an alert mechanism endogenous to the firm.  Top managers 
focus on those areas, both internal and external, that are of greatest strategic importance 
to the firm (Ocasio, 1997).  But they can do this only because middle managers are 
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focusing on those areas of lesser strategic importance.  Middle managers are by definition 
located between the firm’s functional operations and top management.  If there is a 
conflict between functional strategy and induced or formal strategy, that disconnect is 
likely to be noticed first by middle managers, who are responsible for both integrating 
functional strategy into organizational strategy and synthesizing information from various 
sources and reporting to top managers on strategic developments (Floyd & Wooldridge, 
2000; Mantere, 2008).   In short, middle managers are the firm’s first line of defense 
against top managers ignoring the importance of shifting their strategic focus 
(Burgelman, 1994).  Through this research, I am working towards a theory of how middle 
managers go about alerting top managers to the need to, as it were, “look over here.”   
Middle managers are, of course, embedded within firms and firms, like any 
institutions, have their own routines and cognitive schema (Teece, 2007; Moussavi & 
Evans, 1993).  It is therefore worth considering the Division as a context.  Figure 3-1 is a 
word cloud in which the relative size of a word shows its frequency within our interviews 
(after removing common English words and proper nouns).  While not to be taken too 
literally, a word cloud is a useful generative tool in considering the theoretical 
implications of qualitative data (McNaught & Lam, 2010).  Indeed, the relative 
importance of products, people and strategy do allow insights into the Division’s strategy 
process when read in light of our informants’ opinions.  The idea that the Division is 
product focused comes through in my research:  one top manager complained that each 
product team would compete to convince the sales force that its product should be the 
focus of their efforts (would “vie for attention from sales, without paying attention to [the 
Division’s] overall priorities”).  Another senior middle manager felt that the Division’s 
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“product range preceded their current strategy … and doesn’t necessarily dovetail neatly 
with their current strategy.”  Everything follows from the product mix, with both strategy 
and people a secondary concern. 
Figure 3-1: A World Cloud in which the Size of a Word is Proportional to its 
Frequency in our Interviews. 
 
What then can we say about alerting mechanisms at the Division in terms of 
individual behavior and cognition, as well as structural positioning?  What do middle 
managers see, and what do they do about it?  In what follows, I develop a process model 
of middle management alerting (see Figure 3-2).  The process model begins with change 
in the firm’s external environment and internal operations because strategy begins with 
the need to fit the business into its environment (Venkatraman, 1989).  Those top 
managers responsible for induced or formal strategy must pay attention to both internal 
and external developments, either of which can affect performance – or at least have in 
place routines and mechanisms to alert them if their focus should have to shift.  I end 
with TMT attention, which – from my microfoundational/reductionist position – is what I 
understand “organizational attention” to be (Ocasio, 1997).  This is what “alerting” is in 
my model; the proffering of information to top managers that diverts their attention. 
  
79 
 
Figure 3-2: A Process Model of Middle Management Alerting 
 
The next step seems to be that strategically relevant change, either in internal 
operations or in the macro-environment, comes to the attention of a boundary spanning 
middle manager.   This can come from operating managers or from outside the firm.  This 
might also be considered alerting – how is middle managerial attention focused on 
change?  Middle manager attention, however, is not organizational attention, and is thus 
outside my model here.  There is, in any event, nothing particularly surprising about the 
importance of boundary spanning middle managers (Pappas & Wooldridge, 2007).  Here, 
however, we can see the microfoundational mechanism at play:  by spanning 
organizational boundaries, the middle manager is well-positioned to see emerging 
opportunities or threats away from the organization’s focus.  We can also suggest, and 
my research supports this, that middle managers who cross organizational borders are 
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more likely to see environmental change while middle managers who cross hierarchical 
borders are more likely to see a change from internal operations.  What perhaps has not 
been recognized in the literature is that middle managers are active “alerters” rather than 
passive receivers of information.  That is, having seen a change in either the environment 
or in operations, they might then go looking, as both Alice and Dan did, for a matching 
opportunity on the other side (either an environmental opportunity for an internal change 
or an internal opportunity for an environmental change).  In episode 1, Alice had a 
technology based on internal resources and went looking for an opportunity in the 
environment.  Dan found a change in the environment and went looking for (ultimately, 
instigated) a matching internal change, the change from “best possible hardware” to 
“good enough software.” 
Next, how does a middle manager actually get top management attention?  
Middle managers can seek to alert top managers through formal processes and the chain 
of command, or they can go outside the chain-of-command and avoid formal processes.  
In our three episodes, the middle managers went around the formal process, because of 
their frustration with the lack of feedback, the politics, and the high probability of failure.  
But the formal review – and formal processes generally – do have a role to play that is 
somewhat underplayed in our literature, which focuses more on informal networks (Floyd 
& Wooldridge, 1999; Pappas & Wooldridge, 2007).  If we accept that both paths are 
available, why choose one over the other. 
Floyd & Wooldridge’s (1992) typology of middle management strategic activity 
identifies both integrative (synthesis and implementation) and divergent (facilitating and 
championing) activities.  Based on my research, I suggest that middle managers will tend 
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to bring integrative ideas to the attention of top managers formally and divergent ideas 
informally.  In each of the three episodes described, it was important that the middle 
manager did not simply report to his or her supervisor, but directly contacted a member 
of the TMT.  It is likely that formal reporting up the firm’s hierarchy dampens the signal 
to top managers; signaling that it is not urgent that top managers immediately focus on 
this new area.  Direct communication alerts them to the fact that the middle manager 
believes that the need to pay attention is urgent. 
Finally, based on my research, I would note that there is a role here for risk 
tolerance.  Going outside the formal process is risky.  The middle managers who did so 
have broader life experience than other middle managers I spoke with.  They had been 
involved in start-ups (Alice and Bob).  They had greater work experience and education 
(Dan).  They each criticized the Division’s overall strategy and strategy process, 
including its lack of coherence and transparency.  In the end, they each were willing to 
run the risk of failing, even when that risk included a threat to Dan’s job. 
Discussion And Conclusion 
These three episodes are suggestive of possible microfoundational explanations of 
strategic innovation in large, complex organizations.  Of course, because my research 
involves a relatively small number of episodes in a single site, I must be wary about 
generalizing.  As one reader points out, this might actually be a theory of “Alice.”  
Indeed, some of the institutional factors contributing to these episodes might well be 
atypical of organizations generally.  In particular, the focus on growth, while important in 
most organizations, appears to have a particularly strong hold on managers at the 
Division.  This, in turn, leads to the focus on “entrepreneurship by acquisition” and the 
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hostility, appearing to a greater or lesser extent in all three episodes, to spending 
resources on internal development of disruptive innovations.  It should also be said that 
all of my informants agreed that the culture at the Division is very welcoming of middle 
managers and operating managers who make suggestions for innovation.  No one 
suggested that there could be adverse career consequences even from suggesting the most 
disruptive ideas.  Nevertheless, the perception across the organization is that most ideas 
from middle management go nowhere. 
Other facets of these episodes, however, appear to be common across 
organizations.  The importance of access to top management is a common theme in 
strategy research (Raes, et al, 2011), as is the focus on political skills for selling new 
ideas up the organizational hierarchy (Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Dutton, 1997).  These 
episodes illustrate ideas important to the top management (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), 
middle management (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992), and dominant coalition (Cyert & 
March, 1953) literatures.  I therefore tentatively advance a number of ideas worth further 
explanation about strategic innovation and the microfoundations of middle management 
led strategic change. 
Many middle managers, and certainly most of those I spoke with in the course of 
our research, work within the bounds of the organization.  They connect top management 
with operations while ensuring diverse operations across the organization cohere with 
organizational strategy.  Every day, those middle managers work to bring the logic of 
organizational strategy to operating strategy:  they “coordinate dissimilar activities and 
support a coherent [strategic] direction” (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992: 154).  This is, I 
suggest, not an issue of individual heterogeneity.  This is, instead, the formal role of the 
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middle manager mediating between the higher levels of the organization and the lower 
levels.  Other middle managers, for example those involved in sales or purchasing, are 
necessarily embedded within boundary spanning personal networks; they are exposed to 
information about the industry and the environment.  They know their own context very 
well but might not have an overall view of organizational strategy.  This is certainly true 
within the Division, where little attention is paid to giving an overall picture of strategy to 
lower levels of the hierarchy.  These managers, too, are unlikely to champion disruptive 
strategic innovations, and again personal heterogeneity will not have great explanatory 
power. 
The exceptions are illustrated by the middle managers involved in these three 
episodes.  They have access to cross-boundary networks both internally and externally.  
They are positioned within the organization to have both a view of the external 
environment and an overall understanding of organizational strategy.  Finally, they are 
able to conceive of organizational strategy changing (Ren & Guo, 2011).  In addition to 
their structural position, the middle managers upon whom I have focused here suggest a 
number of possible micro-explanations.  They have experience outside of the Division, 
sometimes in start-ups, or in a different milieu (e.g., the arts), or both.  They have at least 
some formal training in strategy and environmental scanning.  They have executive 
experience, or at least exposure to executive work.  Obviously, as noted, they have access 
to top managers, and not just access but often relationships of trust.  They have some 
measure of independence from the organization.  As a result, they have cognitive 
flexibility (Raes, et al, 2011). 
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Finally, they have the ability to work outside of the formal process.  In this 
connection, the difference between Alice and Bob is interesting.  These two middle 
managers have very similar low opinions of the formal strategy review.  Neither thinks 
that the process works, if it is intended to find and promote new strategic opportunities.  
Alice, described by other informants as “entrepreneurial”, has gone around the process 
and found personal and professional success.  Bob, on the other hand, who describes 
himself as “strategic”, has tried to work through the formal process and has failed four 
times, a situation he finds immensely frustrating.  Nonetheless, he says that he will keep 
trying to work within the system.  Alice expects that, eventually, she will “flee” to a start-
up. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE MICROFOUNDATIONS OF MIDDLE MANAGER STRATEGIC 
INFLUENCE IN A HIGH TECH FIRM. 
Middle managers are embedded within the structure of large organizations, 
mediating between organizational levels and units (Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 2008; 
Balogun & Johnson, 2004).  Given their role and position, individual middle managers 
tend to have very detailed knowledge of a relatively narrow operational area and within 
that area are better able than top managers (who, because they have the larger view, are 
likely to have a less detailed picture) to resolve the causal ambiguity linking the firm’s 
resources and its performance (King & Zeithaml, 2001).  Using this local knowledge, 
middle managers are charged with integrating local or functional strategy with 
organizational level strategy, facilitating new local strategies, synthesizing strategically 
relevant information for top managers, and championing new organizational strategies 
(Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000).  If enacted strategy forms as a pattern in a stream of 
decisions (Mintzberg, 1978), it is through these four roles – integrating, facilitating, 
synthesizing and championing – that middle managers influence strategy.  Unfortunately, 
we have no clear understanding of how middle managers use these four roles to influence 
strategy, or whether some middle managers are more likely to influence strategic change 
than others (Woodridge, Schmid & Floyd, 1992).   
In this paper, I present the results of empirical research into this question:  what is 
middle manager strategic influence?  Our understanding of these four roles and how 
middle managers use them to influence strategy has not advanced substantially since they 
were first identified by Wooldridge & Floyd (1992) (Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 
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2008).  And yet, although there has been quite a bit of research into how middle 
managers as a group affect strategy at the organizational level (e.g., Ahearn, Lam & 
Kraus, 2014) and a growing body of research into specific strategic episodes (Rouleau & 
Balogun, 2011), there has been relatively little research into how and why individual 
middle managers are able to influence the development of strategy in large organizations.   
Some of what we do know about middle manager strategic influence has been the 
result of social network analysis of organizations from the middle management 
perspective.  We know, for example, that middle managers with contacts across an 
organizational boundary are more strategically active than other middle managers 
(Pappas & Wooldridge, 2007).  We know that middle manager strategic influence 
depends on their reputational and informational capital; that is, their trustworthiness and 
access to information as perceived by others (Ahearn, Lam & Kraus, 2014).  We know 
that middle manager influence on strategy has an ambiguous (and possibly contingent) 
relationship with organizational performance, with some studies finding negative 
relationships and others finding some evidence of a positive relationship (Wooldridge, 
Schmid & Floyd, 2008).  We know that organizational networks are proxies for 
information flow (Burt, 1992) and that middle managers are embedded within both 
formal and informal organizational networks (Soda & Zaheer, 2012).   
We also know that the fundamental role of middle managers in large 
organizations is to convey strategically relevant information down (“here is our formal 
strategy”) and up (“here is how our formal strategy is working”) (Balogun & Johnson, 
2004).  It is this role as information processors that give middle managers their influence, 
for good or ill, over strategy.  They must take organizational strategy, apply it skillfully to 
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their own responsibilities, and then recognize and report back how well that strategy is 
working.   
Once an organization has left behind its initial entrepreneurial phase, strategy 
largely becomes a question of continued environmental fit (Venkatraman, 1989).  Once 
the organization reaches a certain level of complexity such that internal and external 
monitoring has grown beyond the ability of one or a few individuals, strategy 
development becomes a process of formal and informal routines (Simon, 1997; Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 2000).  This environment/strategy/structure coalignment process 
(Venkatraman, 1989) is at the root of some of the most important streams of strategy 
process research, including the top management team literature (Finkelstein, Hambrick & 
Cannella, 2008), the literature on corporate entrepreneurship, strategic renewal and 
incremental strategic change (Dess, et al, 2003), and the literature on strategic response to 
environmental jolts (Garcia‐Sanchez, Mesquita & Vassolo, 2013).  In all of these 
research streams, the middle management perspective has an important contribution to 
make in furthering our understanding of the mechanisms of strategy process (Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 2000). 
In a large firm, middle managers connect top managers to operations, 
implementing aspects of the firm’s strategic plan and reporting back on the results.  
Middle managers (e.g., purchasing agents, sales managers, marketers) also connect top 
managers to aspects of the external environment.  If strategy largely consists of fitting 
internal operations to the demands of the external environment, then middle managers are 
a key link in this process.  Not surprisingly, then, middle managers can impede the firm’s 
performance (Guth & MacMillan, 1986), or improve upon it (Pappas & Wooldridge, 
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2007).  Confirming this insight, Ahearn, Lam & Kraus (2014) found a curvilinear 
relationship between a middle manager’s social capital and upward and downward 
influence and firm performance.  In other words, middle managers affect firm 
performance. 
There are still gaps, however, in our understanding of the iterative process by 
which middle managers implement, influence and then implement strategy (Wooldridge, 
Schmid & Floyd, 2008).  What routines do middle managers use to influence strategy?  
What explains the contingencies by which some managers, but not others, exercise this 
influence?  Much of our literature treats middle managers as homogenous beings, with 
one just as likely as another to influence the firm’s strategy (Schmid, Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 2010).  Other research, especially research concerned with praxis, focuses 
on specific episodes involving individual middle managers reacting to a particular 
problem or assignment (e.g., Balogun, et al., 2013; Kodama, 2005).  Moreover, “middle 
manager” is a title that hides large differences in position, autonomy and influence.  Does 
middle manager strategic influence depend on some personal characteristic of the 
manager, so that that individual will have influence wherever located in the firm?  Or is it 
a function of position, so that any person so situated will influence strategy?  Or is it 
some combination of these two possibilities?  Another possibility, suggested by Hart 
(1992) but not picked up in the literature, is that middle manager strategic influence is a 
function of top management decisions; that some top managers want assertive, strategic 
middle managers where others prefer middle managers focused on implementation.  
In this paper, I report the results of a study of 49 middle managers located at the 
headquarters of a high tech company in the Northeast.  This study consists of survey 
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results into which middle managers at headquarters are able to influence strategy; the 
basis for that influence (knowledge of the external environment; knowledge of internal 
operations; political skill; and personal relationships); and the extent to which each 
respondent engages in each of the four Wooldridge & Floyd (1992) strategic activities.  I 
also surveyed the respondents about their formal and informal networks throughout the 
organization. I asked about their formal ties (who they report to and who reports to them) 
and their informational (who provides you with information necessary to do your job?), 
advice (who do you go to for advice about performing your job?), and social (with whom 
do you socialize outside of work?) ego-networks.  I use the results to help understand 
which middle managers (in terms of structural position) influence strategy and what 
information and activity they use. 
Before continuing on, it is important to note that this social networks study is 
more an exercise in mathematical sociology, or a type of qualitative research, than it is 
generalizable hypothesis testing (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).  Because of management 
changes at the research site, I was not able to complete a whole-network analysis, nor did 
I randomly select middle managers to survey; instead, all middle managers at the 
headquarters were invited to participate.  That is to say, I do not in this paper claim that 
the relations I’ve found are representative of any group beyond my sample:  I have 
survey responses for 49 middle managers within a single firm (a response rate of 
approximately 35%) and their responses tell us about their network and experiences only 
(Heath, Fuller & Johnston, 2009).  The upside of this is that we can come to a fairly 
complete understanding of the relationships and influence of these middle managers in 
regard to strategy.  The downside is that the theory presented here is suggestive only; it 
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must be tested against a far larger and more varied sample (more managers from many 
more firms) before we can conclude that the associations we see here are seen generally.  
In the end, I am trying to understand why certain of these particular middle managers are 
influential, not hypothesize about middle managers generally (Tichy, Tushman & 
Fombrun, 1979). 
Theoretical Background 
In conception, this research is located within the social learning perspective on 
strategy process (Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 2008; Burgelman, 1988; Mintzberg, 
1978).  The social learning perspective broadly treats learning as a social process 
emphasizing issues of knowing and issues of being; socialization and learning are 
inseparable as learning is understood as being socialization and vice versa (Brandi & 
Elkjaer, 2011).  This is an understanding of learning and knowledge diffusion particularly 
well suited to organizational learning, as it focuses on the socialization processes by 
which information is distributed throughout an organization and integrated into the 
organization’s routines (Granovetter, 1978; Polanyi, 1974).  In particular, the social 
learning perspective suggests that enacted strategy is formed through a quasi-
evolutionary process embedded in the interactions of managers and employees 
throughout the organization with their peers, with other levels of the organization, with 
suppliers and customers, and other aspects of the firm’s environment (Burgelman, 1983; 
Lovas & Ghoshal, 2000; Mintzberg, 1978; van de Ven, 1992).  Through this social 
learning process, organizational strategy changes incrementally over time through the 
accretion of small, successful strategic adaptations based upon socialization into the 
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organization and its environment (Burgelman, 1991; Eden, 1992; Floyd & Wooldridge, 
1999).  
If the firm’s ability to develop and implement new strategy depends upon its 
people and their interrelationships, then strategic decisions by top managers benefit from 
and are shaped by the interpretative efforts of middle managers (Burgelman, 1988).  
Enacted strategy can thus be viewed as a function of two interdependent inputs.  The first 
is the knowledge, skill, experience and internal reputation of the firm’s managers 
(Ahearn, Lam & Kraus, 2014).  The second is their patterns of interaction.  Together, 
these two characteristics imply that middle managers contribute to strategy by learning 
strategically relevant information and then transmitting that information to where it can 
be best used in such a way that it becomes part of the social structure of the organization 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000; Nonaka, 1994).   
In short, without ignoring the key role played by top managers in formulating and 
legitimizing a strategic plan (understood here as decisions about resources and markets) 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Porter, 1980), I proceed from the idea that the link between 
performance and intended strategy (what the organization plans to do) is mediated by 
what the organization actually does (Mintzberg, 1978), and that what the organization 
actually does depends, in part, on the individual characteristics and structural position of 
its middle managers.  This is the middle management perspective on strategy process 
research:  that middle managers influence the formation of organizational strategy by 
integrating, facilitating, synthesizing and championing strategy (Floyd & Wooldridge, 
2000). 
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The middle management perspective has done much to broaden theory about 
strategy formation but has not coalesced into a coherent and cumulative research agenda, 
in the same way that TMT theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1994), in many ways an 
analogous perspective on strategy process, has (Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 2008).  It 
is, for example, unclear whether middle management involvement has a positive or 
negative effect on performance (Ahearn, Lam & Kraus, 2014).  Moreover, middle 
management research has bifurcated into two streams that rarely engage one another.  
One stream looks at middle management strategic involvement as an organizational level 
phenomenon (e.g., Tippmann, Scott & Mangematin, 2013) and the other focuses on 
particular instances of middle management strategic behavior without typically drawing 
conclusions for organizational strategy or performance (e.g., Rouleau & Balogun, 2011).   
As a result of these factors, middle management research has failed (unlike TMT 
research) to explore the implications of middle management heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 
Schmid & Floyd, 2008; Schmid, Floyd & Wooldridge, 2010) for organizational level 
outcomes.  This limits our understanding of both the middle management perspective and 
the social learning perspective because for heterogeneity in individual cognition, 
behavior and structural position ought to make a difference in both strategy development 
and learning, but it is a difference we all but ignore.  Moreover, although the literature on 
the middle management perspective does not touch on this issue, there is no reason to 
believe, ab initio, that each of the four strategic middle management activities identified 
by Floyd & Wooldridge (1992) has similar effects on organizational strategy.  It could be 
for example that poor implementation reduces organizational performance (Guth & 
MacMillan, 1986) without much upside from excellent implementation, while 
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championing new strategies, though rarely successful, has the potential of greatly 
improving organizational strategy (Burgelman, 1994). 
How, then, do we bring heterogeneity into our theory?  Although ultimately, a 
coherent and cumulative middle management research agenda will want to tie middle 
management heterogeneity to organizational performance, in this paper I seek first to 
understand the relationship between individual heterogeneity and strategic influence.  In 
the next section, I develop hypotheses about the antecedents to middle manager strategic 
influence.  As noted, I expect that strategic influence is a combination of behavior and 
knowledge, and is also contingent upon structural position.  
Hypothesis Development 
Behaviors that lead to Strategic Influence 
To begin, what is strategy and what is the role of middle management in 
generating strategy?  In this research, I defined strategy as decisions about resources and 
markets; respondents were instructed that “strategy, for our purposes, can be thought of 
as decisions about what markets to enter, what products or services to offer and how to 
create those products or provide those services” (Appendix A).  Middle managers are 
involved with strategy through implementing, facilitating, synthesizing and championing 
(Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000).  Which of these activities, if any, are linked to middle 
manager strategic influence?   
Given the role of top managers in formulating and legitimizing strategy 
(Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), it seems more likely 
that the upward directed roles (synthesizing and championing) are associated with 
strategic influence than the downward directed roles (Ahearn, Lam & Kraus, 2014).  
  
94 
 
Indeed, there is quite a bit of research indicating that championing, or issue selling 
(Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Rouleau & Balogun, 2011), is a key activity of influential 
middle managers.  A championing middle manager works to shape induced strategy by 
influencing top management’s strategic vision rather than by influencing the particulars 
of implementation (Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 2008). 
There has been less work on synthesizing than on championing, although to some 
extent the literature on issue selling overlaps with synthesizing (Wooldridge, Schmid & 
Floyd, 2008).  Moreover, the growing literature on strategy-as-practice (Vaara & 
Whittington, 2012) includes work on the sensemaking activities of middle managers, 
which are similar to Floyd & Wooldridge’s (2000) conception of synthesizing (Guiette & 
Vandenbampt, 2013; Balogun, 2006, 2007; Balogun & Johnson, 2004, 2005; Rouleau & 
Balogun, 2011).  Sensemaking by lower echelon managers involves interpreting strategy 
change in light of “their existing context of action, ways of thinking, and interactions 
with others.’’ (Balogun & Johnson, 2005, 1574).  Less remarked upon is that synthesizing 
allows middle managers to “sell” incremental strategic adjustments to top managers by 
locating them within existing induced strategy.  In other words, a synthesizing middle 
manager influences strategy by convincing top managers that a new incremental change 
is, in truth, consistent with existing strategy.   
Mantere (2008), having conducted 262 interviews of middle managers to 
investigate the effect of middle manager role expectations on their strategic activities, 
found synthesizing was very common, and led to feelings of continuity and progress.  
Mantere (2008: 307) concludes that synthesizing positions middle managers “as 
‘uncertainty absorbers’, resting their reputation on the robustness of their interpretations 
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of the environment.”  Championing, on the other hand, allow middle managers to feel a 
greater degree of control, so long as championing does not become a free-for-all, where 
top managers fail to sufficiently referee middle managers (Bourgeois & Brodwin, 1984).  
My first hypotheses, therefore, are that middle managers will be more influential to the 
extent that they work up rather than down. 
Hypothesis 1a:  Middle managers are more likely to influence organizational 
strategy to the extent that they engage in championing behavior rather than 
implementing or facilitating. 
Hypothesis 1b:  Middle managers are more likely to influence organizational 
strategy to the extent that they engage in synthesizing behavior rather than 
implementing or facilitating. 
Knowledge that leads to Strategic Influence 
In Hypotheses 1a and 1b, I look at the behaviors of influential middle managers.  
But as I have shown, social learning is a combination of knowledge and being; having 
looked at behaviors, we must now ask what knowledge leads middle managers to be 
influential.  If we accept the idea that strategy is largely concerned with the coalignment 
of internal operations with the external environment (Venkatraman, 1989, 1990), then it 
would seem that middle manager strategic influence would depend upon knowledge of 
operations or of the environment.  That is, a middle manager must have some 
contribution to make to strategy before he or she can influence strategy.  Thus I 
hypothesize that influential middle managers have knowledge of either internal 
operations or the external environment.  Of course, there is the possibility that strategic 
  
96 
 
influence is not based on knowledge, but on personal relationships or political skill.  I 
must control for this possibility. 
Hypothesis 2a:  Middle managers are more likely to influence organizational 
strategy to the extent that they have greater knowledge of internal operations. 
Hypothesis 2b:  Middle managers are more likely to influence organizational 
strategy to the extent that they have greater knowledge of the external 
environment. 
Ego Network Characteristics that lead to Strategic Influence 
Embedded within their organizations, middle managers are part of a number of 
formal and informal networks (Ahearn, Lam & Kause, 2014).  They have a formal 
network of supervisors and subordinates.  They have colleagues who give them 
information they need to do their job (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997).  They have colleagues 
to whom they turn for advice on their jobs and careers (Bono & Anderson, 2005; 
Krackhardt, 1992).  These networks, too, obviously have a role to play in allowing 
middle managers to exercise strategic influence.   
If, for example, strategic influence depends upon knowledge about the firm and 
its environment, then we might expect the middle manager’s informational network to be 
key.  A middle manager with strategic influence might well be a middle manager with 
unique access to strategically relevant information.  It is generally accepted that managers 
who can communicate across what would otherwise be a structural hole in the network 
(that is, managers who control the path through which information must travel) will have 
greater influence than those managers who do not benefit from structural holes 
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(Kleinbaum & Stuart, 2013; Shi, Markoczy & Dess, 2009).  These brokers can use their 
access to a variety of sources of information as the basis for strategic influence. 
Hypothesis 3:  Middle managers are more likely to be influential to the extent that 
they have brokerage opportunities. 
On the other hand, influencing strategy means influencing other people; both 
middle and top managers will have to accept the need for strategic change.  We might 
expect, therefore, that a middle manager’s strategic influence also depends upon trust; 
trustworthy middle managers are more likely to exercise strategic influence because other 
managers will more readily accept their judgment (Mantere, 2008; Floyd & Wooldridge, 
2000).  In this sense, brokerage is not simply control over information that can be used or 
not used to the benefit of the broker.  Rather, brokerage is better thought of as the 
opportunity for a middle manager trusted by two otherwise separate groups of managers 
to communicate information from one to the other for the good of the organization.  An 
influential middle manager must be trusted to act as an honest broker, one who will not 
act opportunistically to profit personally from information. 
Hypothesis 4:  Middle managers are more likely to be influential to the extent that 
they are honest brokers. 
Finally, to what extent do influential middle managers talk to one another?  That 
is, what is the role of homophily?  Homophily, the seeking out of those similar to oneself, 
has received quite bit of attention in social network analysis (e.g., Smith, McPherson & 
Smith-Lovin, 2014).  Social systems, in particular, are characterized by homophily 
(Smith-Lovin, 2007).  Outside their formal roles, do middle managers seek out ties to 
  
98 
 
those like themselves?  Or do they seek out those unlike themselves?  People with 
different characteristics are more likely to have new useful knowledge but it might be that 
influence, too, is a network and the influential people are tied to other influential people 
(Kleinbaum & Stuart, 2013).  This is a somewhat more subtle question in its implications 
than it might seem.  We have, for example, considered the role of political skill or social 
connections in building influence; we have also noted the seeming importance of 
familiarity with either internal operations or the external environment.  A middle 
manager skilled at “issue selling” still needs an issue to sell – influence requires some 
object for its exercise.  But does the influential middle manager sell his own ideas, or 
ideas collected from other nodes on the network? 
If influential middle managers seek each out, the implication is that influence is a 
more subtle concept than we might think.  This implies that influence is not simply a 
question of the last middle manager in the chain taking credit for information or an idea 
with a top managers.  Rather, it implies that influence is recognized along the chain 
stretching from operations or the external environment to top management.  Just as I 
hypothesize that the influential middle manager is an honest broker, I hypothesize that 
influential middle managers seek out other influential middle managers. 
Hypothesis 5:  Middle managers are more likely to be influential to the extent that 
they have ties to other influential middle managers. 
Interactions 
Part of the motivation for this research is to help move the middle management 
perspective beyond its implicit assumption of homogeneity in middle manager strategic 
influence.  It is not the case that we can merely assume that each of the activities 
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identified by Floyd & Wooldridge (1992) is equally influential, or that all middle 
managers are situated so as to engage in each of these activities.  In particular, in this 
research I am interested in the interplay of behavior and knowledge.  This implies that 
some middle managers have access to particular information (e.g., internal operations or 
the external environment) and may be better suited to engage in strategic activities (e.g., 
championing and synthesizing).  I therefore look at the interactions of behavior 
(synthesizing and championing) and strategic knowledge (internal operations and the 
external environment).  Because there is no ex ante reasoning for suspecting that one type 
of interaction is more likely than another to lead to strategic influence, I test all of the 
relevant interactions: 
Hypothesis 6:  Strategic influence depends not simply on the main effects of a 
middle manager’s strategic behavior (i.e., synthesizing, championing, integrating 
or facilitating) or a middle manager’s knowledge of the external environment or 
internal operations, but rather the relationship between influence and behavior 
depends upon the middle manager’s knowledge of the external environment or 
internal operations.  
Methods 
After the research described in Chapter 3, I continued to delve into the processes 
of strategy formation at a recently acquired division of a $17 billion high-technology firm 
headquartered in the Northeast (the “Division”).  On the basis of previous research, I was 
convinced that middle managers wielded real influence over organizational strategy, but 
that that influence was most often felt outside of the formal strategy review, which quite 
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explicitly was aimed at maintaining existing formal strategy.  I was also convinced that 
informal networks – that is, well-established, pervasive and stable networks that were 
outside the formal reporting relationships set up by the Division – were key to 
understanding middle manager strategic influence.  I determined to follow up on previous 
research by conducting a survey for the purposes of uncovering how middle managers in 
the Division understood the process of strategic influence.  Unfortunately, after a change 
in top management at the Division, my access was ended due to concerns about the effect 
the research might have on employee morale given internal changes being made at the 
Division. 
While I still had the cooperation of senior management, I was given contact and 
some employee information (title, department, supervisor and email address) for all of the 
middle managers based at divisional headquarters, approximately 135, as well as a list, 
with the same information, for all middle managers throughout the Division, wherever 
located.  I defined “middle manager” as being at least two hierarchical levels below the 
CEO and one hierarchical level above operating managers (Wooldridge, Schmid & 
Floyd, 2008).  Questions about a particular manager’s status were referred to me and 
resolved in consultation with the human resources department at the Division.  A survey, 
developed in consultation with the Division (see Appendix A), was posted online at 
www.onasurveys.com.  ONA Surveys specializes in network surveys, allowing for 
network specific questions.  All middle managers at headquarters were invited to fill out 
the survey.  The Division provided us with conference space for approximately a week on 
site to help middle managers complete the survey and answer any questions they might 
have.  Senior management (the COO of the Division) sent an email to all middle 
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managers urging them to complete the survey while making clear that participation was 
entirely voluntary.  Approximately half the middle managers (78) completed the survey 
at least in part and I received 49 complete responses, which provide the data for my 
analysis.  After this, senior management at the Division changed and it chose not to allow 
me to continue with my research due to concern that the research would complicate 
internal changes they were contemplating. 
Dependent Variable 
My dependent variable is Influence.    Each respondent was asked to choose from 
a list of all middle managers at the Division those he or she believed was able to 
influence the Division’s strategy.  For each of my 49 respondents, Influence is the sum of 
the votes received.  Self-nomination was not allowed. 
Independent Variables 
Floyd & Wooldridge (1992) Typology:  Because I am interested in which of the 
middle manager activities identified in the Floyd & Wooldridge (1992) typology are 
associated with strategic influence, in the survey I described each activity (Appendix A) 
and asked each respondent how often he or she performs each activity.  The respondent 
was asked to indicate the frequency with which they performed each activity using a 
single five point Likert-type scale ranging from “I never perform these activities” to “I 
frequently perform these activities.”  Their response, centered, are recorded in the 
variables Implement, Facilitate, Synthesize and Champion. 
Knowledge Base:  Each respondent who nominated one or more middle managers 
as influential was also asked about the knowledge on which that influence was based:  
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knowledge of the external environment, knowledge of internal operation, contacts across 
the Division, political skill, a personal relationship with a top manager, or other.  For 
each possible type of knowledge, the respondent was given a 5 point Likert-type scale 
from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree.  The average score for each influential middle 
manager, centered, is recorded in the variables External_Env, Internal_Ops, Contacts, 
Pol_Skill, Per_Rel and Other. 
Homophily:  Do influential middle managers tend towards ties with each other?  
Using the Ucinet procedure Networks  Ego Networks Egonet Homophily, I 
calculated a homophily measure for each respondent using Matches, “a measure of 
homophily that accounts for both the presence of homophilous ties and the absence of 
heterophilous ties divided by the total number of possible ties (n-1, where n is the number 
of nodes in the network specified by the input dataset)” (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman, 
2002).  This score is recorded in the variable Matches.  This indicates the extent to which 
strategic influence flows from one influential manager to another, implying that there is a 
hidden “influence” network among middle managers. 
Betweeness Centrality:  Given the theoretical importance of information flowing 
throughout the organization, to what extent is there a connection between influence and a 
structural position among structural holes in a middle manager’s information network?  
To explore this question, I used the Ucinet procedure Networks  Ego Networks 
Structural Holes for each middle manager’s ego network among those managers who 
supply them with information to do their job.  Using each middle manager’s information 
network, identified by each respondent as being alters who regularly provide the 
respondent with information necessary to do his or her job, I calculated a score for ego 
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betweeness centrality.  I use betweeness centrality because (1) it is highly correlated with 
a network position having many structural holes (Everett & Borgatti, 2005; Burt, 1992); 
and (2) based upon research suggesting that betweeness as measured with egonet data is 
closely correlated with measures of centrality in the global network (Everett & Borgatti, 
2005).  I used the respondent’s information network (rather than their formal reporting 
network, advice network or social network) because of the theoretical importance of 
access to information if the focal middle manager is well situated in terms of filling 
structural holes.  That is, information is valuable in trying to influence strategy only if it 
is not otherwise available to top managers (Shi, Markoczy & Dess, 2009).  This variable 
is Info_Ego_Bet to symbolize that it is a calculation of betweeness centrality for each 
middle manager in their information ego network. 
Honest Broker:  Finally, given the importance of trust to brokerage and the ability 
to capitalize on information, I wish to know whether a given middle manager is an honest 
broker.  Using Ucinet (Networks  Ego Networks Honest Broker  Honest Broker 
Index), I generated a score for each respondent in their advice network.  Deciding to take 
career advice from another manager is fundamentally an act of trust.  I used a normalized 
score (due to the nature of the data and the assumptions of OLS regression) for HBI0.  
HBI0 is the most direct score for honest brokerage, reflecting situations where there are 
no ties between any of the alters connected by the respondent (Walther & Christopoulos, 
2014).  This score is recorded in the variable Adv_nHBI0. 
Interactions 
In order to test the interactions between middle manager upward strategic activity 
and knowledge of the external environment and internal operations, I created the 
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interaction terms Int_OpsxSyth, Ext_EnvxSynth, Int_OpsxChampion and 
Ext_EnvxChampion. 
Controls 
I controlled for a number of theoretically relevant and confounding variables.  
First, I controlled for sex, education and age, personal attributes that theoretically might 
affect whether middle managers are perceived by their peers as having strategic 
influence.  It might be, for example, that other middle managers assume that women, all 
things being equal, are less responsible for observed strategic influence than the men with 
whom they work (Heilman & Haynes, 2005).  Similarly, age and education might 
confound perceptions of strategic influence in respondents (Pappas & Wooldridge, 2007).  
Because my focus is on influence derived from knowledge of internal operations or the 
external environment (because, that is, I focus on strategic fit (Venkatraman, 1989)), I 
also control for other factors that might lead to strategic influence:  influence derived 
from personal relationships (Per_Rel), political skill (Pol_Skill), contacts across the 
organization (Contacts) and other sources of influence that are not knowledge of internal 
operations and the external environment (Other).  I do not mean to suggest that these 
sources of influence are not legitimate, but simply that they might be confounded with 
the knowledge upon which my theory focuses.
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Table 4-1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 Influence 1.31 1.84
2 Female 0.24 0.43 -0.226
3 Age 47.61 7.05 0.064 -0.050
4 Education 3.63 1.15 0.232 -0.192 -0.347**
5 Contacts - - 0.49 0.333** 0.088 0.000 0.058
6 Pol_Skill - - 0.94 0.402** -0.117 -0.030 0.055 0.048
7 Per_Rel - - 0.36 0.698** -0.173 0.002 0.106 0.313* 0.289*
8 Other - - 0.87 0.581** -0.249* 0.035 0.297* 0.235 0.297* 0.323*
9 Implement - - 1.09 0.072 -0.123 0.062 0.037 0.140 -0.252* -0.030 0.068
10 Synthesize - - 1.17 0.238* 0.061 0.003 0.344** 0.104 0.063 0.078 0.293* -0.106
11 Facilitate - - 1.03 0.238* -0.223 0.28* 0.144 -0.142 -0.014 0.086 0.140 0.198 0.308*
12 Champion - - 1.15 0.128 0.049 0.175 0.114 0.069 0.058 0.031 0.064 0.092 0.409** 0.383**
13 Info_Ego_Bet 42.22 182.69 0.078 -0.111 -0.036 -0.305* -0.020 0.129 -0.008 0.228 0.127 -0.126 0.000 -0.086
14 Matches 0.22 0.27 0.094 -0.229 0.103 -0.019 0.029 0.016 0.069 0.150 0.194 -0.107 -0.145 -0.046 0.025
15 Adv_nHBI0 0.15 0.25 0.129 -0.027 0.225 -0.153 0.223 -0.025 -0.053 0.077 0.171 -0.120 0.050 0.109 -0.133 0.263*
16 External_Env - - 1.10 0.565** -0.127 0.031 0.235 0.483** 0.288* 0.558** 0.617** 0.039 0.277* 0.085 0.019 0.005 0.069 0.170
17 Internal_Ops - - 1.31 0.824** -0.170 0.074 0.134 0.245* 0.324* 0.451** 0.44** 0.102 0.001 0.138 0.111 -0.032 0.256* 0.209 0.376**
18 Int_OpsxSynth 0.00 1.37 -0.192 0.010 0.038 0.001 -0.154 -0.081 -0.058 -0.191 -0.165 0.068 0.108 -0.125 0.051 -0.327* -0.204 -0.086 -0.603**
19 Ext_EnvxSynth 0.35 1.24 0.074 0.179 -0.124 0.041 0.068 0.041 -0.074 -0.083 -0.066 0.155 -0.200 -0.104 -0.072 -0.184 -0.050 0.089 -0.080 0.423**
20 Ext_EnvxChampion 0.02 1.20 0.068 -0.100 0.035 -0.032 0.032 -0.001 -0.023 -0.036 -0.069 -0.107 -0.263* -0.448** 0.013 -0.081 -0.073 -0.100 0.037 0.228 0.39**
21 Int_OpsxChampion 0.16 0.93 0.388** -0.176 0.083 -0.042 0.110 0.145 0.052 0.080 -0.013 -0.180 -0.136 -0.38** 0.032 0.086 0.120 0.056 0.399** 0.046 0.272* 0.753**  
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Table 4-2: Results of Three OLS Models of Middle Manager Strategic Influence 
Results 
I analyzed by data using a three model OLS analysis of my dependent and 
independent variables using SPSS.  Table 4-1 reports the descriptive statistics and 
Pearson correlations of the variables.  Table 4-2 reports the results of the three models.  
Diagnostics were consistent with the assumptions of OLS regression.  Because of the 
nature of network data for multiple networks, I examined my data for autocorrelation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(Constant) -0.339 (1.587) 0.210 (1.097) 0.711 (0.628) 
Female -0.116 (0.411) -0.116 (0.260) -0.094 (0.147) 
Age 0.023 (0.026) 0.013 (0.017) 0.005 (0.010) 
Education 0.156 (0.166) 0.146 (0.119) 0.088 (0.067) 
Contacts 0.331 (0.368) 0.124 (0.250) 0.137 (0.138) 
Pol_Skill 0.296 (0.191) 0.132 (0.122) 0.071 (0.067) 
Per_Rel 2.580*** (0.519) 1.971*** (0.367) 1.804*** (0.236) 
Other 0.660** (0.227) 0.178 (0.176) 0.266 (0.100) 
Implement   0.061 (0.104) 0.120 (0.059) 
Synthesize   0.324** (0.112) 0.348*** (0.065) 
Facilitate   0.046 (0.127) -0.098 (0.080) 
Champion   -0.132 (0.104) -0.061 (0.065) 
External_Env   -0.101 (0.148) -0.183* (0.087) 
Internal_Ops   0.843*** (0.100) 1.053*** (0.105) 
Info_Ego_Bet   0.001 (0.001) 0.001* (0.000) 
Matches   -0.814 (0.415) -0.620* (0.237) 
Adv_nHBI0   0.732 (0.474) 0.606* (0.261) 
Int_OpsxSynth     0.413*** (0.081) 
Int_OpxChampion     0.370** (0.128) 
Ext_OpxSynth     0.031 (0.064) 
Ext_OpxChampion     -0.286** (0.089) 
N 49 49 49 
Change in R2 0.663 0.247 0.067 
Overall R2 0.663 0.909 0.976 
Change in F 11.501 9.669*** 19.755*** 
Overall F 11.501 20.046*** 57.583*** 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
(st. error) 
 
    
  
107 
 
issues, but found no reason for concern (Durbin-Watson autocorrelation statistic = 2.009).  
Examination of a P-P plot of the residuals does not indicate any basis for concern over 
the normality of the residuals (Appendix B).   
My first two hypotheses have to do with the relationship between championing 
(H1a) and synthesizing (H1b) and strategic influence, positing that both activities are 
significantly related to influence.  Only synthesizing, however, is significantly related to 
influence (p<0.001).  Thus, Hypothesis 1b is supported and Hypothesis 1a is not.  It is 
worth noting that the regression coefficient of the variable Champion though not 
significant is negative.  Championing is positively correlated with Influence (Table 4-1), 
although not significantly.  A change of signs between correlation and regression can 
indicate excessive collinearity but tests of multicolinearity are reassuring (tolerance of 
collinearity is well within acceptable limits, with the lowest tolerance (the interaction of 
Internal Operations and Synthesis) at 0.477, well above the 0.1 limit at which collinearity 
might present a problem).  Championing is correlated at statistically significant levels 
with Synthesizing (p<0.01), and its negative β likely results from centering. 
Can we say anything about which of these upward directed activities is a more 
important determinant of strategic influence?  As noted above, championing has received 
quite a bit of theoretical interest in the strategy literature, although not much empirical 
research has been done.  There can be little doubt that a middle manager who 
successfully champions a new strategic concept has influenced strategy.  This activity, 
however, is inherently risky.  A middle manager engaged in championing is engaged in 
telling top managers that they must change their strategy.  We can thus surmise that 
championing is a high risk, high payoff venture.  Synthesizing, on the other hand, is a 
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likely a lower risk, lower reward strategy for influencing strategy.  In this role, middle 
managers monitor changes in the industry and the firm.  By putting together information 
from a variety of sources, middle managers bridge gaps between different areas of the 
company and communicate this information to top managers in a form that already makes 
sense under existing strategy.  Synthesizing, in other words, looks much like participating 
in a process of making existing strategy more efficient.  Across middle managers as a 
group, it seems likely that influence comes more from synthesizing than from 
championing, although a successful episode of championing might result in greater 
change than the average episode of synthesizing.  In a post hoc analysis, synthesizing did 
account for significantly more variance explained than championing (p<0.001) and thus 
is arguably a more important predictor of influence (Tonidandel, LeBreton & Johnson, 
2009, 2014).  (The R script used to perform the relative weight analysis is attached in 
Appendix D.) 
Hypothesis 2a is supported:  knowledge of internal operations is a significant 
predictor of strategic influence (p<0.001).  Hypothesis 2b is unsupported:  although 
knowledge of the external environment is significant, it is negative (β=-0.183; p<0.05).  
At least in this sample, knowledge of the external environment reduces the likelihood that 
a given middle managers will be seen as strategically influential by his or her peers.  This 
is an interesting result, although one that is not easy to explain given the importance of 
environmental fit in strategy.  It is true that there is a higher variability in knowledge of 
internal operations (sd=1.31) than knowledge of the external environment (sd=1.10).  
This might indicate that there is more scope for middle managers to leverage knowledge 
of the internal environment, or at least more variability there.  (It might, of course, also be 
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an artifact of this particular sample.)  This result might also have to do with the nature of 
the Division; perhaps it is strategically more focused on its own operations than its 
environment.  Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd (2008) discus how firms with different 
strategic types (using the Miles & Snow (1978) typology) might be influenced by 
different types of strategic activity. 
Hypothesis 3 is supported (p<0.05).  Influence is directly related to betweeness in 
a middle manager’s information ego network.  Middle managers are more likely to be 
influential if they fill structural holes in their information network.  Information traveling 
through the network must travel through influential middle managers because there are 
no (or only limited) alternate paths.  The significance of Adv_nHBI0 (p<0.05) supports 
Hypothesis 4, suggesting that influential middle managers are seen as honest brokers, at 
least among their advice network. 
Matches, my variable testing homophily, is significant but negative (β=-0.620; 
p<0.05), indicating that influential middle managers are more likely to form ties to 
middle managers with less influence than they have.  This is contrary to Hypothesis 5.  
This may mean that influence is created by bridging the gap between top managers and 
other middle managers without influence (Burt, 2005).  In this model, it is possible that 
influence comes not so much from the substantive managerial skills or knowledge of the 
influential middle manager but more likely from brokerage alone.   
Both interaction terms involving knowledge of internal operations are significant, 
indicating that the relationship between influence and both synthesizing and championing 
depends upon knowledge of internal operations (Int_OpsxSynth, p<0.001; 
Int_OpsxChampion, p<0.01).  At any given level of Synthesis or Championing, more 
  
110 
 
knowledge of internal operations results in more influence.  The relationship between 
influence and knowledge of the external environment, on the other hand, is much more 
complex.  There is no significant interaction effect for knowledge of the external 
operations and synthesis.  More interestingly, the interaction of external operations and 
championing is significant but negative:  championing based on knowledge of internal 
operations is associated with increased influence, championing based on knowledge of 
the external environment is associated with decreased influence.  This is consistent with 
(and may simply be an artifact of) the negative but not significant link between the main 
effect of external environment and influence.  It does not imply, I suspect, that 
knowledge of the external environment destroys influence, but rather shows the relative 
importance of synthesizing and knowledge of internal operations, at least in this sample. 
Figures 4-1 and 4-2 illustrate the interaction of knowledge of internal operations 
and synthesizing and championing, respectively.  The interaction of championing and 
knowledge of external environment – which decreases influence in my sample – is not 
shown.  Not only is it difficult to interpret this interaction, but the slopes are not 
significant at plus or minus one standard deviation, indicating that – though significant – 
it is likely not an important determinant of influence in the Division.) Indeed, it is worth 
noting that the interaction between Internal Operations and Synthesis (both of which have 
significant main effects) explains more than twice the variance (r2=.022) than the other 
two interactions combined (r2=.009). 
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Figure 4-1: The Relationship Between Influence and Synthesizing Depends Upon 
Knowledge of the Internal Operations of the Firm, Shown at ± 1 
Standard Deviation. 
Figure 4-2: The Relationship Between Influence and Championing Depends 
Upon Knowledge of the Internal Operations of the Firm, Shown at ± 
1 Standard Deviation. 
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Discussion And Conclusion 
I begin my discussion by emphasizing the limitations of this research.  I am 
describing relationships observed among 49 middle managers, all employed at the 
headquarters of the Division.  There is no generalizability – certainly in a statistical sense 
– from this analysis.  My respondents were not drawn randomly from a larger population 
and due to the end of my site’s cooperation, I cannot make any statements about how 
representative my respondents are even of the middle managers at the Division.  
Moreover, given my high r2 (0.976) it is likely that – if treated as generalizable – 
influence is over-determined by my analysis.   
Another important limitation is the possibility that my results were skewed by 
common method bias (Craighead, et al, 2009).  All of the data in this study comes from 
the same instrument (Appendix A) and thus we must be concerned that the data has been 
skewed by the tendency of data collected by a single method to cohere.  There are, 
however, reasons to think that the possibility of common method bias is itself limited:  
the independent variable (Influence) was collected from the surveys of middle managers 
nominating their peers as influential.  The only other data collected from these same 
respondents about their influential peers was the perceived sources of their influence 
(knowledge of internal operations, knowledge of the external environment, contacts 
across the Division, personal relationships with top managers, political skills and other).4  
                                                          
 
4 Forcing respondents to explain influence using 5 point Likert scales rating influential middle 
managers on each of these six dimensions of influence accounts for about half the variation in 
influence explained in my research. 
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It is possible that, having nominated a middle manager as influential, the respondent was 
biased towards relatively high responses on one or more of the sources.  Still, there were 
multiple sources of influence offered, some of which were not the subject of research but 
rather used as controls (contacts, personal relationships and political skill) and they were 
also given the opportunity to tie influence to some other unspecified source.   
All other data points concerning individual middle managers were supplied not by 
the respondents who nominated a middle manager as influential, but by the middle 
manager about him or herself without knowing their score on Influence and without the 
ability to self-nominate.  Moreover, the ego-network variables (Matches, Adv_HBI0, and 
Info_Ego_Bet) could not be known to the respondents at the time they completed the 
survey.  Harman’s (1976) single factor test, although a blunt instrument, did not reflect 
common method bias; it found seven factors, none of which explained more than half the 
variance (the largest explained 19.5% of the variance; the largest four explained 
approximately half the variance).   
Despite these limitations, this study is a good foundation for future research.  I 
have, for one group of middle managers, a very good model of what strategic influence 
means.  This is a contribution on its own.  The idea, for example, that synthesis is more a 
determinant of influence than championing is new in our literature, and should be useful 
to both researchers and managers in the future. 
I also bring nuance to our implicit assumptions of homogeneity in research into 
the middle management perspective on strategy research.  In particular, I focus on the 
conception of strategy as the degree of fit between internal resources and the external 
environment (Venkatraman, 1989, 1990).  Although induced strategy is formulated and 
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legitimized by top managers (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), they cannot perform this task 
without the inputs of middle managers, who based upon their detailed knowledge of 
particular areas of internal operations or the external environment (Burgelman, 1983a), 
might see opportunities or threats that top managers miss.  In particular, my results 
indicate that both synthesizing (as a middle management activity) and knowledge of 
internal operations are more important to strategy development and strategic renewal than 
our literature has heretofore recognized. 
These findings also have implications for top managers and for practitioners 
generally.  First, this research reminds us that organizations are, in large measure, a 
response to bounded rationality (Simon, 1947).  Top managers are primarily responsible 
for scanning the environment and preparing the firm for the challenges ahead through 
decisions about investing in resources.  But top managers cannot, themselves, keep track 
of all the relevant data inside and outside the firm; they must rely on middle managers to 
spot threats or opportunities.  Middle managers, on the other hand, should pay attention 
to the strategic context of their own firm.  In the Division where I did my research, it 
seems clear that knowledge of internal operations and synthesizing that knowledge to 
make sense of it in light of existing strategy is the most direct path to strategic influence.  
It is likely that other firms have other paths, but it is worth the time of middle managers 
to learn about their own best path to influence.  Similarly, middle managers should think 
about their own ego-networks.  Do they fill structural holes?  Do they seek out managers 
who have access to information but might not otherwise have a path to top managers?  
Are they trusted?  Top managers would likewise be advised to pay attention to how 
information flows throughout the firm. 
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My research also suggests a path forward for theory and future research.  In 
particular, what empirical research there has been into middle manager strategic influence 
has tended to concentrate on championing or issue selling (Wooldridge, Schmid & Floyd, 
2007; Schmid, Floyd & Woodridge, 2010; Rouleau & Balogun, 2011).  Moving forward, 
my research suggests that synthesizing is worth paying attention to.  Similarly, research 
into middle manager strategic influence has not previously focused on the relative 
importance of internal v. external knowledge. My research suggests that for middle 
managers, some level of external knowledge is important but that knowledge of internal 
operations is more likely to lead to strategic influence.  (This also implies that top 
managers are keeping an eye on the external environment themselves and relying on 
middle managers to monitor internal operations.)   
At a broader level, I would suggest that this research shows the value of pursuing 
a microfoundations research agenda in strategy process.  On the one hand, I have not tied 
middle manager strategic influence to organizational strategy.  But there are, on the other 
hand, suggestions in this research about the types of routines and individuals behaviors 
that can add or subtract from the incremental evolution of strategy and environmental fit.  
In some sense, from the vantage point offered by this research, the emphasis on 
championing in the literature and the lack of focus on synthesizing is odd.  The heroic 
middle managers who through force of personality wrenches organizational strategy off 
the path approved by top management is a romantic figure, but how often can that 
happen.  Synthesizing is much different.  A synthesizing middle manager has done much 
of the legitimation work of strategy development by putting a suggested change in terms 
that align with organizational strategy.  A championing middle manager might demand 
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that the organization “must” make some change; a synthesizing middle manager explains 
that the organization “should” make some change because the change is actually more in 
keeping with its strategy than the status quo.  An influential middle manager is a middle 
manager to can talk to top management using their own terms.  Both in terms of praxis 
and more quantifiable research, this is a fertile area for furthering our understanding of 
the cogs and wheels of strategy development. 
I also hope that I have contributed to bringing network analysis to strategy 
process research.  I am not the first to do so by any means (Pappas & Wooldridge, 2007), 
but there has been less work is this field than one might expect.  Strategy development is 
an iterative, evolutionary process in which the success or failure of one change is used to 
help shape the next, while at the same time the internal resources of the firm are shaped 
by the external environment and vice versa.  This is, in other words, a complex 
longitudinal social learning process.  As network theory and the tools of network analysis 
improve to allow for more subtle measures and larger data sets – including testable 
predictions of how networks change over time – network analysis becomes more and 
more useful to the strategy process scholar.  In other words, strategy process is a function 
of multiple networks within the firm; a qualitative tool measuring network function is a 
natural fit. 
Finally, this research points us to the ultimate “pot of gold” in strategy process 
research:  mapping complete networks of middle managers within multiple businesses.  
At that point, we will be able to test the effects of organizational and individual 
heterogeneity on firm performance.  This paper should emphasis both the value and the 
difficulty of conducting such research. 
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CHAPTER 5 
GENERAL CONCLUSION 
What we do see depends mainly on 
what we look for.  Lubbock (1892) 
What is this dissertation about?  Does it make a contribution? 
This dissertation is about tracing the roots of strategic change to the cognition and 
behavior of individual middle managers, keeping in mind that they are embedded within 
organizations, social networks and routines.  My contribution is to begin to trace the cogs 
and wheels – the routines and individual behavior – that lead to strategic change.  I also 
set the stage for future research tying the contingencies of middle management strategic 
influence to strategic change and then to organizational performance.  Strategic change, 
particularly change meant to improve the fit of the organization’s strategy with its 
environment and capabilities, has long been recognized as an important issue in strategic 
management research.  Until recently, however, research into the fundamental processes 
and causes of strategic change (the “how” rather than the “why”) has been limited.  In 
this dissertation, I explore the how of strategic change. 
Because I look at how, the scope of research and theory narrows.  The 
organizational effect of better strategic fit is a question suited for broad answers:  better 
fit leads to better performance.  How these changes occur, however, is more fractured.  
There are a number of ways that organizational strategy changes, not all of which can be 
studied together.  As research becomes more granular and focused, it becomes less 
universal and all-encompassing. 
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Unlike a traditional dissertation, which is meant to be one cohesive document 
from beginning to end, I have presented here three separate papers, one conceptual, one 
qualitative and theory building, and one qualitative.  Each paper is designed to be 
published separately in a peer reviewed journal and thus each paper makes a separate 
contribution to our theoretical understanding of strategy process.  This is, perhaps, 
somewhat more work up front and brings less natural coherence, but it has its advantages.  
My conceptual paper, for example, does not simply present the theory for my empirical 
work.  Rather it is an attempt at a broader understanding of the antecedents of middle 
manager strategic influence than I could test empirically in this project.  My qualitative 
paper was allowed to develop naturally from my research and led me in a direction that I 
would not have contemplated at the beginning of this project; I did not have to force my 
findings into a pre-conceived mold.  As a result of all this, my network analysis in the 
third paper is a more organic product of my research agenda and surprised me with the 
findings I developed.  I was not expecting the important role of synthesizing and internal 
operations in building middle manager strategic influence. 
In the end, however, all three papers, though independent, remain strongly linked.  
The idea linking these three papers together is the heterogeneity of middle managers and 
of the organizations in which they are embedded.  Middle managers have different 
attributes, skills and structural positions, and these differences influence their ability to 
change organizational strategy.  This is a microfoundational view of strategy, seeking on 
the individual level for the mechanisms that drive organizational level results.  I have 
therefore chosen to focus on a particular mechanism of strategic change.  I look at middle 
manager involvement in strategy formation, and not just middle manager involvement but 
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upward divergent strategic change.  I find this type of change interesting because it is 
relatively rare, because it depends upon both organizational and individual heterogeneity, 
and because it results from a social learning process that can be mapped and studied.   
As I note in the third paper, the social learning perspective is that learning and 
socialization are one; that organizational learning can be seen as a function of 
information gathering behavior and the diffusion of that information throughout the 
organization.  Thereafter, a type of sensemaking (Rouleau & Balogun (2011) speak of 
sense wrighting) synthesizes this information into coherence with existing strategy, 
which changes incrementally as the organization’s context changes.  This is a familiar 
story in strategy that informs theories about sensemaking, issue selling, strategic renewal 
and the microfoundations of strategy process.  Without in any way attempting to 
overthrow this concept of strategy process as a process of incremental evolutionary 
change, I hope that in this dissertation I have made clear that strategy process is 
somewhat more complex.  Strategy process depends upon managers (top and middle) 
with different interests, different skills and different structural positions.  Moreover, we 
should not assume that all organizations are alike; strategy process in one might look 
much different from another.  Traditionally, strategic management research, with its 
focus on organizational level causes and effects, has not had to delve into the complexity 
of individual organizations.  We have, I submit, left that state behind.  It is time to 
welcome heterogeneity and complexity into strategy process research, and to drive our 
research deeper, even at the cost of breadth. 
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APPENDIX A 
HUMAN SUBJECTS REVIEW APPROVAL FORM 
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APPENDIX B 
SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
 
Thank you for taking this survey. We appreciate your time and effort.  From everyone who completes the survey, 10 people will be 
chosen at random to receive Amazon gift cards worth $50.00 each as a token of our appreciation.  (About 140 people in Bedford are 
eligible to complete the survey.) 
This survey is part of a research project investigating how businesses form and change their strategies. In particular, we are 
researching the role middle managers play in implementing and contributing to strategic change. To explore this idea, we are 
conducting a survey of your professional networks. Simply put, we want to know who you go to for advice about your job and who 
provides you with information you use to do your job. This will help us understand how information and ideas flow through RSA. We 
will also be asking some demographic questions and some other questions about your relationship with RSA to help us better 
understand our results. As discussed below, your answers are completely confidential. 
In total, completing this survey should take about 15-20 minutes.  If you wish, you can leave the survey at any time and return to it 
later.  I will be at RSA, in the multifunction room off the Cafe, on Thursday, 6/13, and Friday, 6/14, to answer questions and help 
with survey completion. 
RSA has very kindly allowed us access and has agreed to support your participation in this research project. This research, however, 
is being conducted by me and by other researchers at the Isenberg School of Management at the University of Massachusetts 
Amherst, not by RSA. RSA understands and has agreed that it will not have access to any raw data, or to any data from which it can 
determine who said what. Your survey answers will be entirely confidential. Any information presented to RSA or anyone else will be 
anonymized, aggregated and carefully screened to avoid giving individually identifiable information about you or your department, 
or about anyone else who completes the survey. 
If you have any questions, please come see me Thursday or Friday in the multifunction room, email me 
at dcohen@isenberg.umass.edu or call me at 413-577-2241. If you would like to receive an summary of our findings, please check the 
box provided at the end of the survey and we will send it to you once our research has been completed.. 
Very truly yours, 
David G. Cohen 
Isenberg School of Management 
UMass Amherst 
dcohen@isenberg.umass.edu 
As a participant in this study, you have certain privacy rights protected by federal law. 
We are not aware of any professional or personal risks to you if you complete this survey.  The survey and our methods of collecting 
and protecting the data have been approved by an Institutional Review Board at the Isenberg School of Management, which is 
empowered to protect the interests of people who participate in our research.  If you have any questions, please email me 
at dcohen@isenberg.umass.edu. 
If you have any concerns about your rights as a participant in this study you may contact the Human Research Protection Office via 
email (dabutter@mgmt.umass.edu) or by telephone (+1-413-545-5678). 
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The first set of questions below ask you whether you agree or disagree with statements about 
your relationship with RSA. 
For each statement, please indicate whether you strongly agree that the statement describes 
your relationship with RSA, agree, have no particular reaction one way or the other, disagree 
or strongly disagree. 
Remember:  Your survey answers are strictly confidential. 
  
1. When someone criticizes RSA, it feels like a personal insult. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
2. I am very interested in what others think about RSA. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree Nor Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
3. When I talk about RSA, I usually say "we" rather than "they." 
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
4. RSA's successes are my successes. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
5. If a story in the media criticized RSA, I would feel embarassed. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
6. When someone praises RSA, it feels like a personal compliment. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
7. I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career with RSA. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
8. I enjoy discussing RSA with people outside RSA. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
9. I really feel as if RSA's problems are my own. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
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10. I think that I could easily become as attached to another company as I am to RSA. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree Nor Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
11. I do not feel like part of the family at RSA. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
12. I do not feel emotionally attached to RSA. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
13. RSA has a great deal of personal meaning for me. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
14. I do not feel a strong sense of belonging at RSA. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
  
The next set of questions asks about strategy.  Strategy, for our purposes, can be thought of 
as decisions about what markets to enter, what products or services to offer and how to create 
those products or provide those services.  Managers contribute to strategy in four different 
ways, some of which are part of their formal job description and some of which are 
not.  Please read the four brief descriptions below and then answer questions about each of 
these different strategic contributions. 
A.      Managers contribute to strategy by implementing strategic change.  They communicate 
and sell new strategic directions approved by top managers to lower-level managers.  They 
inject new strategic priorities into the business.  They design and supervise action plans 
designed to meet top management objectives and translate business goals into objectives for 
their subordinates.  Finally, the monitor activities within their unit to make sure that the unit is 
supporting the company’s objectives. 
B.      Managers contribute to strategy by creating safe spaces within their own unit for 
experimentation and then evaluating the results of the experiments, encouraging some and 
discouraging others.  For the right project, they will relax standard regulations and 
procedures, encourage multidisciplinary problem solving teams, and use unit resources to 
nurture promising unofficial projects. 
C.      Managers often apply strategic reasoning to emerging events and information, 
communicating their interpretation to others.  In this role, managers monitor changes in the 
industry and the activities of competitors, suppliers, government and other outside 
organizations.  This can involve putting together information from a variety of sources, 
bridging gaps between different areas of the company and then communicating this 
information to top managers. 
D.      Finally, managers can search out new strategic opportunities and try to sell them to top 
managers.  This can involve justifying new or existing programs or processes to top 
managers.  
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15. How often do you perform activities described in Type A. 
 
I frequently perform these activities 
 
I often perform these activities 
 
I regularly perform these activities 
 
I rarely perform these activities 
 
I never perform these activities 
16. I you could design your own job, how often would you perform activities described in Type 
A. 
 
I frequently perform these activities 
 
I often perform these activities 
 
I regularly perform these activities 
 
I rarely perform these activities 
 
I never perform these activities 
17. How important do you believe the activities described in Type A are to your doing a good 
job in your present position? 
Of the Utmost Importance Very Important Important Somewhat Important
Not at all Important 
18. How often do you perform activities described in Type B. 
 
I frequently perform these activities 
 
I often perform these activities 
 
I regularly perform these activities 
 
I rarely perform these activities 
 
I never perform these activities 
19. I you could design your own job, how often would you perform activities described in Type 
B. 
 
I frequently perform these activities 
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I often perform these activities 
 
I regularly perform these activities 
 
I rarely perform these activities 
 
I never perform these activities 
20. How important do you believe the activities described in Type B are to your doing a good 
job in your present position? 
Of the Utmost Importance Very Important Important Somewhat Important
Not at all Important 
21. How often do you perform activities described in Type C. 
 
I frequently perform these activities 
 
I often perform these activities 
 
I regularly perform these activities 
 
I rarely perform these activities 
 
I never perform these activities 
22. I you could design your own job, how often would you perform activities described in Type 
C. 
 
I frequently perform these activities 
 
I often perform these activities 
 
I regularly perform these activities 
 
I rarely perform these activities 
 
I never perform these activities 
23. How important do you believe the activities described in Type C are to your doing a good 
job in your present position? 
Of the Utmost Importance Very Important Important Somewhat Important
Not at all Important 
24. How often do you perform activities described in Type D. 
 
I frequently perform these activities 
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I often perform these activities 
 
I regularly perform these activities 
 
I rarely perform these activities 
 
I never perform these activities 
25. I you could design your own job, how often would you perform activities described in Type 
D. 
 
I frequently perform these activities 
 
I often perform these activities 
 
I regularly perform these activities 
 
I rarely perform these activities 
 
I never perform these activities 
26. How important do you believe the activities described in Type C are to your doing a good 
job in your present position? 
Of the Utmost Importance Very Important Important Somewhat Important
Not at all Important 
Please choose from the list below middle managers working for RSA in Bedford who you 
believe are able to influence RSA's strategy because of his or her position within RSA, through 
political skill, or through a good personal relationship with a top manager (do not choose 
yourself, your boss or your direct reports).  You can choose as many managers as you like, 
but typically there would not be many such managers within an organization. 
When choosing names from the list, you can search for the name you have in mind, you can 
search through the list, you can filter the list by one of the categories provided, or you can 
type in any name you don't find on the list. 
For each of the middle managers you've selected, please indicate the extent to which you 
agree with the following statements.  These statements are not intended to be mutually 
exclusive; if for example a particular manager is influential both because he or she has good 
knowledge of RSA's internal operations and a good personal relationship with a top manager, 
you can rate both statements "strongly agree" or "agree."  
1. This middle manager is able to influence strategy because of his or her knowledge of the 
external business environment in which RSA operates 
  Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither Agree or 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
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2. This middle manager is able to influence strategy because of his or her knowledge of RSA's 
internal operations. 
  Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither Agree or 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
     
3. This middle manager is able to influence strategy because of his or her contacts across 
RSA's various product lines and departments. 
  Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither Agree or 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
     
4. This middle manager is able to influence strategy because of his or her political skill. 
  Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither Agree or 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
     
5. This middle manager is able to influence strategy because of his or her good personal 
relationship with a top manager. 
  Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither Agree or 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
     
6. This middle manager is able to influence strategy for some reason other than those listed 
above. 
  Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither Agree or 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
     
From the list below, please select people at RSA who regularly provide you with information 
that helps you do your job.  By "regularly" we mean reliably and on an ongoing basis, but not 
necessarily every day or even every week. By "information" we mean data you need to 
complete your assigned duties.  The next series of questions will ask about people you rely 
upon to give you job and career advice. 
If you regularly receive information that helps you do your job from people outside RSA 
(colleagues at EMC; customers; suppliers; industry association contacts; media members, 
etc.), you can add their names in the small text box to the right of the larger box.  Please type 
their names in the space provided (no one else at RSA will be able to see the names that you 
add). 
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When choosing names from the list, you can search for the name you have in mind, you can 
search through the list, you can filter the list by one of the categories provided, or you can 
type in any name you don't find on the list. 
Please list people who regularly provide you with advice that helps you do your job (by 
"regularly" we mean reliably and on an ongoing basis, but not necessarily every day or even 
every week).  This could be your boss or the people you manage, or it could be friends inside 
or outside RSA who are not formally connected to your job. 
For people inside RSA, you can choose from the list below. For people outside RSA (colleagues 
at EMC; customers; suppliers; industry association contacts; media members, etc.), please 
add their names in the space provided (no one else at RSA will be able to see the names that 
you add). 
When choosing names from the list, you can search for the name you have in mind, you can 
search through the list, you can filter the list by one of the categories provided, or you can 
type in any name you don't find on the list. 
Please select the name of your boss (the person to whom you directly report) from the list 
below. 
1. In your opinion, is your boss able to influence RSA's strategy, because of his or her position 
within RSA, through political skill, or through a good personal relationship with a top 
manager?  (If the answer is "Yes", but for more than one reason, choose the reason you 
believe is primary.) 
  Yes, because of 
his or her 
position 
Yes, through 
political skill 
Yes, through a good 
personal 
relationship 
Yes, but for 
some other 
reason 
No 
 
     
2. To what degree do you agree or disagree with the statement "I am able to influence RSA's 
strategy through my influence with my boss. 
  Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
     
From the list below, please select the names of the people you supervise (your direct reports). 
For each of your direct reports, please indicate whether each of the following statements is 
true. 
1. In the past, my direct report has convinced me that RSA should change its strategy. 
  Yes No 
 
  
2. I rely on my direct reports to show me a needed change in RSA's strategy. 
  Yes No 
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3. In the past, I have tried to influence RSA's strategy through the assignments and/or 
directions I have given to my direct reports. 
  Yes, successfully Yes, unsuccessfully No 
 
   
4. In my opinion, my direct report is able to influence RSA's strategy through political skill or 
through a good personal relationship with a top manager other than myself. 
  Yes, due to 
political skill 
Yes, due to a good personal 
relationships 
Yes, for some 
other reason 
No 
 
    
1. Are you male or female? 
\n  
2. In what year were you born? 
 
3. What is the highest degree you have earned? 
\n  
4. I would like to receive an abstract of your findings. 
 
Many thanks for completing the survey. Your response has been recorded and you can close the browser window. If 
you would like to change your response just click on the email which included a link to this survey. 
David Cohen 
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APPENDIX C 
NORMAL P-P PLOT 
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APPENDIX D 
R SCRIPT FOR PERFORMING A RELEATIVE WEIGHT ANALYSIS ON 
SYNTHESIZING 
This script is based upon a script generated at http://relativeimportance.
davidson.edu with modifications by the author (Tonidandel and LeBreton, 2014). 
 
rawdata<-read.csv("rwadata.csv", header=TRUE) 
attach(rawdata) 
thedata<-data.frame(Influence, Female, Age, Education, Implement, Synthesize, 
Facilitate, Champion, Info_Ego_Bet, Matches, Adv_nHBI0, External_Env, 
Internal_Ops, Contacts, Pol_Skill, Per_Rel, Other) 
Labels<-names(thedata)[2:length(thedata)] 
multRegress<-function(mydata){ 
numVar<<-NCOL(mydata) 
Variables<<- names(mydata)[2:numVar] 
 
mydata<-cor(mydata, use="complete.obs") 
RXX<-mydata[2:numVar,2:numVar] 
RXY<-mydata[2:numVar,1] 
 
RXX.eigen<-eigen(RXX) 
D<-diag(RXX.eigen$val) 
delta<-sqrt(D) 
 
lambda<-RXX.eigen$vec%*%delta%*%t(RXX.eigen$vec) 
lambdasq<-lambda^2 
beta<-solve(lambda)%*%RXY 
rsquare<<-sum(beta^2) 
 
RawWgt<-lambdasq%*%beta^2 
import<-(RawWgt/rsquare)*100 
 
result<<-data.frame(Variables, Raw.RelWeight=RawWgt, Rescaled.RelWeight=import) 
} 
 
 
mcompultBootstrap<-function(mydata, indices){ 
 mydata<-mydata[indices,] 
 multWeights<-multRegress(mydata) 
 return(multWeights$Raw.RelWeight) 
} 
 
multBootrand<-function(mydata, indices){ 
 mydata<-mydata[indices,] 
 multRWeights<-multRegress(mydata) 
 multReps<-multRWeights$Raw.RelWeight 
 randWeight<-multReps[length(multReps)] 
 randStat<-multReps[-(length(multReps))]-randWeight 
 return(randStat) 
} 
 
multBootcomp<-function(mydata, indices){ 
 mydata<-mydata[indices,] 
 multCWeights<-multRegress(mydata) 
 multCeps<-multCWeights$Raw.RelWeight 
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 comp2Stat<-multCeps-multCeps[5] 
 comp2Stat<-comp2Stat[-5] 
 Labels2<<-Labels[-5] 
 return(comp2Stat) 
} 
 
#bootstrapping 
install.packages("boot") 
library(boot) 
 
mybootci<-function(x){ 
 boot.ci(multBoot,conf=0.95, type="bca", index=x) 
} 
 
runBoot<-function(num){ 
 INDEX<-1:num 
 test<-lapply(INDEX, FUN=mybootci) 
 test2<-t(sapply(test,'[[',i=4)) #extracts confidence interval 
 CIresult<<-data.frame(Variables, 
CI.Lower.Bound=test2[,4],CI.Upper.Bound=test2[,5]) 
} 
myRbootci<-function(x){ 
 boot.ci(multRBoot,conf=0.95,type="bca",index=x) 
} 
 
runRBoot<-function(num){ 
 INDEX<-1:num 
 test<-lapply(INDEX,FUN=myRbootci) 
 test2<-t(sapply(test,'[[',i=4)) 
CIresult<<-data.frame(Labels,CI.Lower.Bound=test2[,4],CI.Upper.Bound=test2[,5]) 
} 
 
myCbootci<-function(x){ 
 boot.ci(multC2Boot,conf=0.95,type="bca",index=x) 
} 
 
runCBoot<-function(num){ 
 INDEX<-1:num 
 test<-lapply(INDEX,FUN=myCbootci) 
 test2<-t(sapply(test,'[[',i=4)) 
CIresult<<-
data.frame(Labels2,CI.Lower.Bound=test2[,4],CI.Upper.Bound=test2[,5]) 
} 
 
myGbootci<-function(x){ 
 boot.ci(groupBoot,conf=0.95,type="bca",index=x) 
} 
 
runGBoot<-function(num){ 
 INDEX<-1:num 
 test<-lapply(INDEX,FUN=myGbootci) 
 test2<-t(sapply(test,'[[',i=4)) 
CIresult<<-data.frame(Labels,CI.Lower.Bound=test2[,4],CI.Upper.Bound=test2[,5]) 
} 
 
 
 
multRegress(thedata) 
RW.Results<-result 
 
RSQ.Results<-rsquare 
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#Bootstrapped Confidence interval around the individual relative weights 
#Please be patient -- This can take a few minutes to run 
multBoot<-boot(thedata, multBootstrap, 10000) 
multci<-boot.ci(multBoot,conf=0.95, type="bca") 
runBoot(length(thedata[,2:numVar])) 
CI.Results<-CIresult 
 
#Bootstrapped Confidence interval tests of Significance 
#Please be patient -- This can take a few minutes to run 
randVar<-rnorm(length(thedata[,1]),0,1) 
randData<-cbind(thedata,randVar) 
multRBoot<-boot(randData,multBootrand, 10000) 
multRci<-boot.ci(multRBoot,conf=0.95, type="bca") 
runRBoot(length(randData[,2:(numVar-1)])) 
CI.Significance<-CIresult 
 
#Bootstrapped Confidence interval comparing 2 variables 
#Please be patient -- This can take a few minutes to run 
multC2Boot<-boot(thedata, multBootcomp, 10000) 
multC2ci<-boot.ci(multC2Boot,conf=0.999, type="bca") 
runCBoot(length(thedata[,2:(numVar-1)])) 
CI.Predictor.Comparison<-CIresult 
 
 
#R-squared For the Model 
RSQ.Results 
 
 
#The Raw and Rescaled Weights 
RW.Results 
#BCa Confidence Intervals around the raw weights 
CI.Results 
#BCa Confidence Interval Tests of significance 
#If Zero is not included, Weight is Significant 
CI.Significance 
#BCa Confidence Interval Tests of significance 
#Comparing one predictor with all others 
#If Zero is not included, Weights are Significantly different from one another 
CI.Predictor.Comparison 
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